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and to clear any quotations with them.Abstract: In providing precautionary incentives and allocating
environmental risk, liability for environmental damages faces two
difficulties: randomness of damages incurred and nonobservability
of precautionary measures. Hence, a major obstacle in enforcing
legal claims is the difficulty of proving causation. In order to
alleviate the proof of causation, the German Umwelthaftungsgesetz
introduces a refutable causality presumption. When imperfect
information is taken into account, this conditional reversal of the
burden of proof cannot ensure optimal precaution. Using a principal-
agent model, optimality conditions for a modified strict liability rule
is derived. A specific rule for the optimal allocation of
environmental damages under probabilistic causation and
asymmetric information is obtained using a linear model.
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Although general liability law has a long historic tradition (cf. for example
Landes, Posner 1987, 2ff), liability for environmental damages has become
only recently an important instrument of practical environmental policy.
Due to growing public concern about environmental accidents, over the
past decades many industrialised countries introduced specific legal acts
dealing with the liability for pollution damages
1. The Federal Republic of
Germany, introduced the Environmental Liability Act in January 1991
2 and
is currently preparing a comprehensive Environmental Code
(Umweltgesetzbuch, UGB). Similarly, on the European level, various
attempts to reform tend to strengthen environmental liability. The
European Commission recently emphasised the role of environmental
liability (cf. EU Commission 1993). Likewise, the Commission presented a
draft for the Directive on Civil Liability for Damages Caused by Waste
(1991, O.J. (C192) 6). Moreover, the Council of Europe agreed on a
Convention on Civil Liability for Damages resulting from Activities
Dangerous to the Environment (June 21, 1993, European Treaty Series
150). Other countries, notably the United States and Japan, saw major
changes in their legislation with respect to liability for environmental
1 In the context of this study, 'damages' refer to the degree of
environmental degradation incurred and therefore deviates from the use of
the term in the law and economics literature. There, 'damages' refer to the
compensatory payments the defendant has to make to the plaintiff. These
compensatory payment will be referred to as liability payments here.
2 Umwelthaftungsgesetz, UmweltHG December 10, 1990, effective
January 1, 1991, 1990 Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I, BGB, p. 2634.damages already during the 1980's. In 1980, the United States introduced
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Liability, and Compensation
Act (CERCLA) already. CERCLA was followed by the Superfund
Amendments (SARA) in 1986 (cf. Grigalunas, Opaluch 1988, Acton
1989) which imposes a retroactive joint and several liability on potential
tortfeasors that might have contributed to the contamination of a specific
site. More recently, after serious damages to coastal ecosystems have been
caused by major oil spills, the Oil Pollution Liability Act (OPA) of 1990
was enacted. In Japan, the so-called four major lawsuits at the beginning of
the 1970's brought a shift in environmental legislation in particular as
regards victims' entitlement to compensation (cf. Zweifel, Tyran 1994, 48).
A. Civil Liability as an Instrument of Environmental Policy
The German Umwelthaftungsgesetz (UmweltHG) defines environmental
liability as liability for individualised losses (health, property and, to a
certain extent, ecological damages
3) which are caused by_ an environmental
impact (cf. Section 1 and 2 UmweltHG). Typically, civil liability does not
provide for compensation for damages to the environment as such . Instead
3 Liability for ecological damages has been intensely debated during the
legislative procedure prior to the enactment of UmweltHG. Basically, two
variants of ecological damages can be distinguished. First, an ecological
loss, i.e. a damage to the environment which constitutes at the same time
an individual property loss (for example degradation of water quality in
some privately owned fish pond). Secondly, a pure ecological damage
which refers to a damage to the environment without any interference with
private property rights. It is argued that the latter case only will arise in
very few instances (cf. Landsberg, Lulling 1991, 36ff). Therefore, theit aims at protecting private property rights. Therefore, all those damages
that do not interfere with private property, for example that exhibit pure
public goods characteristics, currently cannot be recovered under
UmweltHG. However, some proposals for reform, in particular on the
European level, provide for subsidiary claims to be made by government
authorities or common interest groups (cf. Pappel 1995, 7Iff). The
enforcement problem in presence, of uncertain causation and asymmetric
information addressed in this study, however, will even arise a situation
where only two parties are involved in the environmental problem
4.
From an economic point of view, environmental liability law should aim at
two objectives. On the one hand, environmental liability should induce the
potential polluter to take an efficient level of precaution regarding the
environmental risks involved in their economic activities. A Pareto-
optimal level of environmental risks is achieved if the potential polluter
takes into, account full external costs due to expected environmental
damages, when deciding upon his economic activities that relate to either
the probability or the severity .r environmental degradation (cf. Siebert
1991). Ideally, the anticipation of ex post liability provides ex ante
incentives to take adequate precaution (see Cropper, Oates 1992, 693). On
the other hand, environmental liability should bring about an optimal
sharing of environmental risk between polluter and injured party (cf.
Cooter 1991). Although, the implications of different liability rules for
criticism of environmental liability as a means of intemalisation should not
be based on the fact that it might not encompass this type of damage.incentives have been well recognised, the risk-sharing effects have been
largely neglected (exceptions being Shavell 1982, Segerson 1987, Laffont
1994)
5.
Compared to other instruments of controlling environmental risk, liability
is regarded as an attractive instrument of environmental policy, because of
its efficiency in the use of decentralised information (cf. Bohm, Russell,
1985, 434). The information needed to determine the Pareto-optimal
allocation of environmental risk is typically distributed among different
individuals. The availability of this information constitutes the central
difficulty in designing environmental policy
6. In the institutional setting of
environmental liability, (legal) action with respect to the internalisation of
4 Please note that although, the individual might not have a right to clean
ambient atmosphere, an appropriate liability rule can enable it to recover
losses it suffers from breathing polluted air.
5 However, the ongoing debate on insurance of environmental risks shows
that the allocation of environmental risk, also constitutes highly relevant
issue. In insuring environmental liability, the insurance crisis in the United
States during the mid eighties indicated (cf. Winter 1991), a variety of
technical problems can arise (cf. Kunreuther 1987, Breining 1990). Hence,
the risk allocation implied by different liability rules is an equally
important factor in the choice of a policy option as are the incentive
effects. The fundamental problem in insurung environmental risk is related
to the different roles of environmental media as a public consumption
good (being subject to a social risk) and as a receptable of pollutants
(being subject to a private risk). Only in the case of individual risks, risk
pooling is feasible (cf. Siebert 1995, pp. 265ff; Dasgupta 1982). Hence,
first party insurance of the public good dimensions by private insurance
companies will be impossible. Private good dimensions like individual
health and private property damages can, however, be covered by first-
party-insurance. As regards the public g-^ jd dimension only a liability
insurance is conceiveable.
6 This information problem was first pointed out by von Hayek 1945.third party damages is sinitiated by those who are directly affected.
Thereby, injured parties negatively affected by environmental pollution
provide information on the incidence of environmental degradation (cf.
Streissler 1994, 253). Properly designed liability laws lead potentially
polluting firms to anticipate not only current but also potential future
environmental risks long before environmental damages manifest
themselves and catch the attention of an environmental policy maker.
Moreover, liability induces private individuals to acquire information on
potential environmental risks generated by their economic activities
without government intervention (cf. Panther 1992 for a detailed
discussion). Thereby, liability constitutes an important instrument of
preventive environmental policy (cf. Simonis 1984, O'Riordan, 1985,
critical Kirsch 1988). Liability regimes differ in their information
requirements, though. A strict liability rule does not rely on decentralised
information regarding cost of precaution or the precautionary measures
implemented by the individual emitter (cf. for example Feess, Hege 1994)
and cpntinuos monitoring of pollution control techniques implemented is
not required. In addition, a strict liability leaves it to the polluter to choose
the most efficient pollution control techniques.
In providing precautionary incentives and allocating environmental risk,
environmental liability faces two problems: First, the unobservability of
stochastic influence factors and second, the information asymmetry
regarding the precautionary measures taken. If both incentives and risk
sharing are addressed in a situation of uncertainty but complete
information, both can be examined separately (as for example in Segerson
1987). It is well known from principal-agent theory, however, that, if oneallows for asymmetric information, there will be a Trade-off between
incentives for precaution and optimal risk sharing (cf. Sappington 1991).
B. Uncertainty and Environmental Risk
Environmental pollution is characterised by substantial uncertainty
regarding both the extent and the ultimate consequences of pollutants
discharged. This complicates the implementation of optimal environmental
policies
7. Uncertainty is due to a number of reasons. The incidence of
emissions and pollutants ambient in the environmental media is by far not
known exactly. Neither is the exact nature of the environmental problems
involved perfectly understood, nor is the interaction between different
pollutants and their diffusion within and between different environmental
media, nor is the accumulation of harmful substances over time exactly
known. A classification of the different types of risk or uncertainty
involved in environmental pollution is given by Siebert 1987, 1991, 194f.
Stochastic factors influence the incidence and the extent of environmental
damages basically by two different relationships. Firstly, the diffusion
process can be subject to a random variable. Then, the relationship
between net emissions and the level of pollutant ambient in the
environment, i.e. immissions, becomes uncertain. This can be due to
uncertain meteorological and topographic conditions. A related situation
7 The possible consequences of uncertainty with respect to costs and
benefits of pollution abatement on different policies have been analysed in
the seminal works of Weitzman 1974, Adar. Griffin 1976, and Roberts and
Spence 1976. More recently, Baumol, Oates 1988, p. 190ff and Siebert
1987 provide an overview of this issue.arises when emissions of several polluters contribute jointly to ambient
levels of pollutants and individual discharges cannot be observed directly.
In the latter case, it is irrelevant whether the joint effect of individual
discharges is deterministic or stochastic. Secondly, the relationship
between the level of precaution and actual level of emissions may be
subject to uncertainty. A variety of environmental accidents on different
scales indicate, that polluters may only be able to control their emission of
pollutants imperfectly. Then, the actual level of emissions is also a random
variable
8. In the following, it will not be distinguished whether the random
influence is due to technical disturbances or stochastic diffusion processes.
For the incentive scheme that will be derived, it does not matter whether
there is either a single suspected polluter or whether there are several
suspected polluters
9. In both cases, it is not possible to infer from the
8 Please note that according to well established results in principal agent
theory, ideally the polluter should be rewarded based on the variable which
he controls. Therefore, if the polluter does not have complete control over
the quantity of substances emitted, generally incentives should be based on
the precautionary effort.
9 Models of multiple polluters often focus on the strategic interaction
among different emission sources in the choice of their precaution levels
(cf. for example Miceli, Segerson 1991, Feess and Hege 1994, Xepapadeas
1991). However, given the large number of potential contributors to
pollution, in particular in non-point-source pollution, it seems rather
artificial to concentrate on the strategic interdependence in precautionary
levels. It seems more plausible that the substances emitted by others are
regarded as fixed exogenous level plus maybe a random disturbance.
Moral hazard in teams does not arise if there is no strategic
interdependence. Moreover, it seems rather unlikely, that although neither
the environmental authorities nor the court cannot observe the precaution
level taken, that other polluter can observe this variable. For the remainder
of this study it will be assumed there exists a sufficiently large number ofobserved ambient pollution whether the polluter took appropriate
precaution.
C. Enforcing Legal Claims under Uncertain Causation
The main problem in enforcing environmental liability is the difficulty of
proving causation (Dewees, 1992, 436f). The enormous scientific
uncertainty regarding exposition trails of pollutants gives rise to the
problem of uncertainty over causation. In many cases, environmental
damages lack verifiable, deterministic causal connection in the sense of a
necessary condition of the harm incurred which is required by many legal
systems, i.e. a conditio sine qua non
 10.This makes it impossible to prove
causation in a deterministic sense (cf. Siebert, 1991, 188). Since the
burden of proof is with the claimant, legal claims will often not be
enforceable. Moreover, in the case of multiple emission sources,
identification of the polluter responsible for the harm incurred may be very
difficult. Uncertain causality refers to damages that have been generated by
several, interacting causes whose contribution cannot easily be separated
because of unobservable stochastic processes and because of asymmetric
information regarding the level of precaution taken or the quantity of
substances emitted".
emittors such that the individual precaution levels do not influence the
precaution taken by others emission sources.
1
0 For overview of the legal problems involved under German law cf.
Assmann 1988, Landsberg, Lulling 1991, 77ff.
1
1 Unobservable stochastic factors both in the diffusion process and the
relationship between the precaution taken and the net emissions, prevent it
to infer from the observed level of concentration of ambient pollutants
10D. Strategies For Solving the Problem of Proving Causation
In a situation of uncertain causalion, whether a polluter can be held liable
in legal disputes for any damage that is (at least partly) due to his
emissions depends crucially on the procedural rules regarding the burden
of proof
12. The question of who should be assigned the burden of proof is
not only a normative issue, of which party should bear the consequences of
unreducable ex post uncertainty, but also entails substantial incentive
effects. The most obvious relieve as regards the burden of proof is to
introduce a strict, i.e. non-fault based, liability. Under a strict liability, the
only evidentiary requirement is that the harm suffered was caused by the
operation of an environmentally risky plant. Basically, there are two
different strategies under uncertain causality. One is to establish some
threshold regarding causation. The other is to hold potential causes liable
in proportion to the probability of causation. Both approaches will be
discussed in turn below.
1. Use of a Threshold Criterion
In practise, often all-or-nothing rules with respect to causality are used.
All-or-nothing rules insist on a causation in fact and deny the probabilistic
linkage between precaution and damages. This' might cause liability to be
either excessive or non-existent. If the injured party were to establish
causality with certainty, this is by the probabilistic nature of multicausal
stochastic environmental problems could be controlled optimally in a
trivial way by imposing ex ante safety regulations.
1
2 The German Umwelthaftungsgesetz, for example, attempts to alleviate
the difficulty of proving causation by reversing the burden of proof and
establishing a refutable causality presumption.
1.1damages impossible. Therefore, the polluter never would have to face
liability payments. The opposite result emerges, if the burden of proof is
reversed, and the polluter were to prove that a specific damage was not
caused by his emissions
13. Assigning the burden of proof to the polluter
would solve the problem of imperfect internalisation of environmental risk
at the expense of an excessive liability (cf. Adams, 1986, p. 15 Iff ,
Siebert, 1987, p. 121ff).
A modified version of the all-or-nothing rule relies on a threshold level
regarding causality by requiring an specific probability of causation or by
imposing conditional conjectures of causality
14. Following the second
approach, conditional presumptions as regards causation are established.
The Environmental Liability Act of 1990 provides for such a refutable
conjecture of causality. It will be shown in this study that, the reversal of
the burden of proof which is conditioned on compliance to legally
prescribed safeguards (so-called regular operation) will lead to an
inefficient level of precaution by the potential polluter.
2. Liability in Proportion to the Probability of Causation
Alternatively, proving causality might be facilitated by allowing
probabilistic proof of causation and imposing strict liability proportional to
the probability of causation. The idea of proportional liability was
1
3 A different situation arises; if perfect information can be obtained at
some cost. In this case, as Panther 1992 shows, the burden of proof should
be with the cheapest information provider.
1
4 For example, in Anglo-American case law the notion of an predominant
probability of causation is widespread (cf. Balensiefenl994).
12developed in the United States by the California Supreme Court in context
of product liability
15, where potential causes were held liable according to
their market shares which were used to approximate the ex post probability
of causation.The analogon to market share liability in the case of multiple
emission sources is liability according to the emission share's (cf. Panther
1992). This scheme is not feasible, however, if indidivual emission levels
are not publicly observable.
The problem of uncertain causality has been first rigorously analysed by
Shavell 1985, 1987, p. 123ff. Shavell considers a simple model where
besides a potential injurer, an additional natural source might have caused
an environmental accident. Both sources cause a loss of a exogenously
fixed size with known ex ante probabilities. Whereas the background
probability that the natural sources causes a damage is assumed to be fixed,
the probability that the potential injurer generates a damage is inversely
related to his level of care. Panther 1992, p. 181 ff, derives a similar model
where, in contrast to Shavell, damages vary continuously. In determining
the share in pollution discha ge contributed by a given source, both,
Shavell and Panther, assume that the level of precaution or likewise the
emission level is publicly observable. This constitutes a strong idealisation,
since in the case of many problems it is more likely that the level of
precaution is, at least to some degree, private to the polluter. Precautionary
pollution control measures may be unobservable either because they
plainly cannot be observed at all (as in non-point source pollution) or
because monitoring cost are prohibitively high. Hence, the environmental
1
5 Sindell vs. Abbott Laboratories, 607P. 2d 924 (Cal 1980) cert, denied,
13policy maker is faced with a situation of asymmetric information. The fact
that the polluter can hide his action gives rise to the problem of moral
hazard.
E. Aim of This Study
Summarising the specific features of environmental damages that have
been outlined above, the key difficulties in enforcing environmental
liability stem from the existence of uncertainty about the ultimate impact
of emissions and the importance of asymmetric information with respect to
the precautionary measures taken Past research on uncertain causality in
environmental liability has largely ignored information asymmetries (cf.
e.g. Shavell 1985, 1987, p. 123, Panther 1992).
The aim of this study is to extend the economic analysis of environmental
liability to a situation of multicausal, stochastic damages and asymmetric
information due to unobservable individual pollution control efforts. Using
a principal-agent framework, an optimal liability rule will be derived. It
will be argued that applying a discrete all-or-nothing decision rule
regarding evidentiary requirements is not optimal. Instead uncertain
causality should be taken into account in the liability rule itself. A
modified strict liability rule is able to generate socially efficient precaution
if the liability share of the polluter follows the ex post probability of
causation given that a certain damage occurred. It will be shown that, if the
polluting firm is risk neutral, the first best solution can be attained by
simply holding the firm operating a environmentally risky plant liable for
449 U.S. 912(1980).
14all damages that might be caused by its emissions. In a more general
context, however, a full strict liability may lead to inefficiencies. If
polluters are risk averse, it is not optimal to hold them liable for all
occurring damages, since this would cause them to carry out excessive
preventive measures.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The provisions of the
new German Environmental Liability Act related to proving causation are
analysed in the section 2. Section 3 presents a general model of optimal
incentive schemes in environmental policy when pollution control by the
emitting firm cannot be observed. Section 4 derives the optimal liability
rule in the context of a simplified linear model which allows the derivation
of results that can be interpreted in economic terms. The conclusions of the
theoretical analysis and its policy implications are summarised in section 5.
II. Effects of a Conditional Reversal of the Burden of Proof
This section will model the implications of the evidentiary requirements
regarding causality, as provided for under new German Environmental
Liability Act of 1991 when monitoring problems in assessing the
preventive pollution control measures are taken explicitly into account.
The Umwelthaftungsgesetz (UmweltHG) aims at strengthening the
position of the injured party bv introducing a reversal of the burden of
proof (cf. Section 6 and 7 UmweltHG)
 16. In contrast to German tort law
1
6 The conditional reversal of the burden of proof takes up the idea
developed by the Federal High Court in the so-called Kupolofen-ruling. In
this legal dispute, the Federal High Court decided that under certain
conditions, it is the duty of the plainfiff to proof that he has complied with
15(cf. Section 823 et seq. of the German Civil Code), now the burden of
proof is with the operator of an environmentally risky plant
17. Furthermore,
the legislator established a refutable causality presumption if, given the
circumstances of the specific case, the operation of the facility is capable
of generating the harm suffered by the plaintiff (cf. Section 6 UmweltHG).
Thus, the injured party only has to prove that the defendant's facility is
capable to have caused the harm, not that it actually has caused it. In order
not to be held responsible, the operator of the plant would have to show
that either his emissions are not capable to cause the damage incurred or
that other sources (not subject to the UmweltHG) are equally capable to
cause the harm (cf. 7 UmweltHG). In order to fulfil the evidential
requirements of the claim for damages, injured parties have a claim on
information to be provided by the polluting firm and the government
authorities (cf. Section 8,9 UmweltHG).
There is, however, an important exception from the presumption of
causality. If the polluter has complied to the legally prescribed standards of
regular operation (besondere Betriebspflichten), the presumption does not
apply (cf. section 6, para 2 UmweltHG )
18. The standard of regular
the safety regulation and thereby the emissions cannot have caused serious
harm (BGH Z 92/143).
1
7 The legal terminology of the UmweltHG assigns the legal responsibility
to the operator of a plant or facility. Although, in a strict legal
interpretation a plant is not the same as a firm, in this study firm or polluter
will be used synonynously.
1
8 A second condition for an exemption from the causality presumtion is
that there is been no disruption in the operation of the plant. But the legal
literature on the Umwelthaftungsgesetz takes the view that if all legal
obligations have been met by the operator of the facility, then all cases of
16operation is defined in the Federal Air Pollution Control Act
(Bundesimmissionsschutz-Gesetz) In the case that regular operation has
not been violated, the Environmental Liability Act requires the injured
party to establish causality of the emissions of a specific plant. This
corresponds to the principle of full-proof governing German tort law. The
burden of proof is with the claimant. If the firm can prove compliance with
the legal requirements, the general conjecture that the environmental
damage was caused by the operation of the potentially harmful plant is
excluded
19. In this case, given the multi-causal nature of environmental
pollution, it is almost impossible for injured party to fulfil the evidential
requirements regarding the causal relationship between the operation of the
plant and the environmental damage.
The procedural rules for the stylised decision-making under a conditional
reversal of them burden of proof can be summarised in the following
diagram:
disruption will also be cases of force majeure (cf. Landsberg, Lulling
1991). And since liability is excluded in cases of force majeure (see
Section 4 UmweltHG), for the purpose of this study, it is sufficient to
concentrate on the compliance with the legally prescribed safeguards.
1
9 Under certain conditions periodoc inspection will be sufficient (cf.
Section 6, para 4 UmweltHG).
17FIGURE 1: PROCEDURAL RULES OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY ACT OF 1990
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Under the assumptions made with regard to the uncertain and multicausal
nature of environmental damages, the conditional reversal of the burden of
proof together with the causality presumption suggests, in fact, that
exclusion from the causality presumption is equivalent to the exclusion
from liability. Therefore, in the following, it will be assumed that, if the
polluter has taken an adequate level of pollution control, he is freed from
environmental liability. If, by contrast, the firm has not taken the legally
prescribed measures of environmental protection, the firm will be held
liable at all for damages.
A. The Model
In order to focus on the analysis of the incentives of the part of the
polluting firm entailed by the provisions of the UmweltHG, free-rider
problems among multiple injured parties are neglected. Instead, the
framework is one of a bilateral externality. Moreover, courts are assumed
to enforce the liability rules perfectly and costlessly. It will also be
assumed that there exists only one type of polluter with known pollution
control costs who faces known a known distribution of liability payments.
This assumption allows to abstract from problems that arise in the case of
heterogeneous defendants.
18Under a conditional reversal of the burden of proof, liability payments are
awarded if the perceived care is smaller than the standard of regular
operation. Thereby, a conditional reversal of the burden of proof generates
similar effects as a negligence rule (cf. Schwarze 1996). Under very
specific conditions, a conditional reversal of the burden of proof can
induce efficient precaution. If the legal standard is defined at the socially
optimal level, the polluter knows with certainty which standard will
required in litigation, and the level of precaution is perfectly observable
efficient precaution will be achieved. However, these idealistic assumption
are not very likely to given in reality. Therefore in this study, the
somewhat more realistic assumption is made that there is uncertainty
involved regarding the findings of compliance to the legally prescribed
safety standards
20. In the model presented here, uncertainty is due to
imperfect observability of pollution control activities. Equally, uncertainty
may be due to the fact that the polluter is unable to control his level of care
completely
21. Then for a given level of precaution taken the polluter is
uncertain if he is going to be responsible for proving causation in
litigation. Uncertainty may be due to by an unforseeable decision of court
2
0 From a different perspective Jost 1993 analyses strategic behaviour in
legal disputes under new German Environmental Liability Act in the
presence of asymmetric information about the compliance of potential
injurer with legally prescribed environmental safeguards. If information on
precautionary measures is private to the polluting firm, the question is,
whether the information given in court is a truthful revelation. The
disclosure of information in litigation is also analysed in a related paper
Jost 1995.
2
1 In this case it is necessary to distinguish between the level of care at the
moment the accident happens and precaution which is only stochatically
19in respect to the standard of regular of operation, when the court's
interpretation of the evidence presented is not known perfectly
beforehand
22.
It will be assumed that only an imperfect signal s of the actual
precautionary effort, denoted by e, can be observed
23.
related to care (cf. Diamond 1974, 109). In this study both expressions,
care and precaution, are used synonymously.
2
2 Uncertainty in the court's decision on verifying causality is similar to the
problem of assessing negligent behaviour. In contrast to the model
presented in this study, however, in models of uncertain court decision the
distribution of the signal is not parametrised by the effort level. Uncertain
court decision being due to jury decisions seem to be a more severe
problem in Anglo-American law than in the Continental European legal
system, have been analysed by Kolstad Ulen, Johnson 1990, Cooter, Ulen
1986, Craswell, Calfee 1986, and Calfee, Craswell 1984.
2
3 There is a growing literature on different aspects of errors in legal
disputes: The optimal degree of accuracy and how it affects the optimal
probability and magnitude of sanctions is discussed in Kaplow 1991,
Kaplow, Shavell 1992, Polinsky, Shavell,1989. The impact of the fact that
not all injurers being held liable on the behaviour of injurers is analysed by
Posner 1973. Png 1986, Ehrlich 1982, and Kaplow, Shavell 1994 look at
the accuracy in determination of liability in models of law enforcement.




Suppose that the court can only observe s = e + e, where £ is normally
distributed, zero mean random variable
24. Let G(s|e) denote the
distribution function of the imperfect signal of precautionary efforts, s, for
a given mean of e, with a density function, g(s e) from g(s-e) =g(e). The
probability that the polluter will end up in legal dispute with a perceived
level of precaution lower than the given standard of regular operation n is
2
4 This assumption restricts the analysis to symmetric errors. Biased errors
are discussed by P'ng 1986, Kolstad, Ulen, and Johnson 1990, and
Craswell and Calfee 1986. Normality of the distribution is not essential. It
facilitates a comparaitve static analysis for varying degrees of uncertainty.
21n-e
(1) p(s <n)=p(e +e<n) = jg(e)de = G(n-e)
This is the probability that the polluter will have to compensate expected
environmental damage Q(e). The polluting firm will be presumed to have
caused the damage incurred if and only if s < n, where n indicates the
standard of regular operation. The firm will not be liable for any damage if
the observed precaution indicates that the legal obligations guiding regular
operation have been meet. If, however, the firm's level of precaution does
not meet the legal requirements, the polluting firm will be held strictly
liable for the damage incurred.
In the case of a conditional reversal of the burden of proof, the rule for
assigning responsibility, l(s), for a given standard of regular operation is:
(2) l(s(e,e)) =
0 otherwise.
Polluters who are found to be responsible for the damage incurred are
assumed to be assessed liability payments that are equal to the observed
environmental damage. Let expected environmental damages be denoted
by Q(e) = E q(e;0), with Q being a downward sloping strictly convex
function (i.e. Qe <0, Qee >0). E q(.) denote expected environmental
damages and E being the expectations operator. 9 describes the stochastic
diffusion process by means of a zero mean normal distribution. As in this
22section decision makers are assumed to be risk neutral, the random
variable 9 will be suppressed for the remainder of this section.
Carrying out precaution involves some costs to the polluter which are
denoted by f(e), with fe > 0, f^ > 0. Hence, provided that the random
variables 0 and e are stochastically independent, total expected costs of the
polluting firm under a conditional reversal of the burden of proof are
(3) TC = E [f(e) + l(s(e, e)) Q(e)] .
At the moment at which the potential polluter takes the decision about the
appropriate level of precaution, he faces uncertainty because he only
controls the observable signal only imperfectly. Hence, the polluter is not
fully immunised against being held liable. Even if the polluter takes a
sufficiently high level of precaution, there is still a positive probability that
he will be held liable. The incentives to comply with legal requirements
will, apart from the cost of precaution and expected liability payments,
depend in particular on the degree of uncertainty with regard to the true
precaution level.
Rewriting total environmental costs, TC, for a risk-neutral polluter gives
(3') TC = f(e) + Q(e)G(n - e)
For analytical convenience, the assumption is made that TC is strictly
convex
25. Let subscripts denote partial derivatives. The first-order
2
5 That is, expected liability payments, Q(.)G(.), have to be convex. This
means that the strict convexity of the environmental damage function is
preserved when it is multiplied by the distribution function G(.). If the
23conditions for a cost-minimum under a conditional reversal of the burden
of proof are then
(4) /. +QeG(n-e)-Q(e)g(n-e) = O
provided that e > 0
26.
At the optimal level of precaution, the marginal costs of precaution have to
equal the marginal expected liability payments. The change in expected
damage payments can be decomposed into two separate effects which
indicate the impact of a marginal increase in precautionary effort on
expected liability payments:
• The "damage effect" QeG(.), describes the reduction in expected liability
payments due to the marginal reduction in expected environmental
damage. Due to the fact that G(.) < 1, the incentives to take
precautionary measures are weakened compared to the social optimum,
because the conditional reversal of the burden of proof shelters the
polluter partly from being held liable.
• The "liability effect", -Q(.)g(.), indicates the savings in expected
liability payments due to a decreased probability of being held liable
density function g is single peaked, this corresponds to the assumption that
the marginal Likelihood does not deline too fast beyond the peak, that is g'
must not take large negative values. For the remainder of this section this
will be assumed to be the case.
2
6 Here, it is assumed that e>0 at the minimum. A corner solution, e = 0,
can occur if the first unit of precaution does not reduce expected liability
payments enough to match the cost of precaution caused by this first unit
of effort. To restrict the analysis to interior solutions, it will be assumed
that this case does not arise.
24when precaution is increased
27. As the marginal probability of being
held liable is -g(n - e), the potential polluter can reduce the chance of
being found non-compliant by increasing the level of observable
precaution. The marginal change in the Likelihood of being found non-
compliant is weighted by the total environmental damage for which the
polluter might be held liable. This implies that incentives to take
precaution measures are sharpened by the a reversal of proof.
Whether or not the cost-minimi.'-ing level of precaution rises as a net result
of these two offsetting effects will depend on the relative size of the
damage effect versus the liability effect. Whether or not the incentives to
exert precautionary effort are sharpened or weakened can be distinguished
by evaluating the first-order condition at the social optimum, where - Qe =
fe. Please note that the assumptions made with respect to Q(e) and f(e), the
minimum of total environmental costs, Q(e) + f(e), is characterised by the
first-order condition, i.e. fe = -Qe. This gives Qe (G-l)- Q(.)g < or > O. As
the first term on the LHS is positive, this reflects the reduction in
incentives to take precaution and vice versa for the second term. Thef^et
effect will depend on various factors, such as the cost of precaution, the
liability payments the polluter has to face when being presumed to be
responsible, the degree of uncertainty in assessing the level of precaution,
and the risk-attitude of the polluting firm. In the following, the role of
these factors will be analysed in the comparative static analysis below.
2
7 As marginal environmental damage is negative and the probability of
being held liable is positive, the first term is always negative. So is the
second, as the damages and the density function are both positive.
25B. Comparative Static Analysis
This section will derive the reaction of the polluting firm to changes in the
cost of precaution, in the environmental damages incurred, in the standard
of regular operation and in the degree of uncertainty in assessing
compliance to regular operation. Some of these factors can be regarded as
policy parameters of the environmental policy maker. In order to analyse
the effects of such changes, parameters representing exogenous factors are
introduced in the cost of precaution function f(e) and the expected
environmental damage function Q(e). Let c denote exogenous determinants
in the cost of pollution control f(e;c), with f^ > 0 and y denote exogenous
factors affected expected environmental damages. There are basically two
ways by which exogenous factors can affect the damage function. The first
type of impact is due to an increase in the background level of pollution.
This is captured by a change in the total damage. The second type of
impact changes the marginal expected damage that can be prevented by an
additional unit of precaution. Likewise, parameter y can be regarded as
policy parameter as the environmental policy maker. So far, it was
implicitly assumed that the actual harm incurred was compensated. Any
change in the legal provisions that define liability payments will have
similar effects on precaution as a change in environmental damages. Also,
the effect of costly litigation can the represented by a shift in the expected
damage functions. If, for instance, the polluter will have to bear the cost of
litigation when found responsible the damage function will shift up.
Parameter y can also reflect the evaluation of the physical environmental
risk involved. Consequently, an increase in risk aversion leads to a
clockwise rotation of the damage function (cf. Siebert 1995, pp. 266 ff). As
26to the change in environmental damages, it will be assumed that the
damage function will rotate clockwise, if the environmental risk potential
increases, i.e. Qy > 0 and Qey < 0
28. This is the case, for instance, if the
natural assimilation capacity of the ecosystem declines and thereby the
maximal damage expected at very low precaution level rises whereas the
maximal precaution level where expected damages are reduced to zero or
to very low levels is not changed to the same extent. The safeguards levels,
n, defining regular operation are a policy parameter of the environmental
legislator. The degree of uncertainty in observing compliance is
exogenously given by the variance of the distribution of the observation
error e - N(0,G
2).
Implicit differentiation of the first-order condition yields
(5) [^ + Qee G(n-e) - 2Qe g(n-e) + Q (e) g'(n-e)] de + f^ dc +
[Qey G(n-e) - Qy g(n-e)] dy + [Qe Gn - Q(e) gn] dn = 0
where Gn and gn indicate the partial derivatives of the distribution function
and the density function with respect to the regular operation standard n,
with Gn >0, but gn > 0 if n < e and gn < 0 if n > e.
1. The Effect of Changes in Environmental Damages and Costs of
Precaution
An increase in the marginal cost of precaution will lead to a decline in the
level of precaution, since
2
8 Notice that the expected damage function is negatively sloped. Hence, a





The denominator will be greater than zero, if g'(.) does not take large
enough negative values to overcompensate the remaining three terms. It
was assumed that the marginal Likelihood does not decline too rapidly for
values of n > e.





The effects of changes in the extent of potential environmental pollution
can be easily obtained as
(8) *= -Qo+Q*>
d dy fee+QeeG-2Qeg+Qg'
28The optimal effort level rises as a consequence of a rise in damaging
consequences of the polluters activities, for Qey < 0, Qy > 0
29.
Both reactions deviate from the socially optimal reaction. The socially
optimal reaction can be obtained by differentiation of the first-order
condition for a social optimum -Qe=fe.




Likewise for a change in the environmental risk we obtain
(H) ^ = -^L_>0
dy L + Q*
Thus, whether the polluting firm will reduce (increase) precaution to a
larger or a smaller extent as a consequence of an increase in the costs of
precaution (potential environmental damages) under a conditional reversal
of the burden of proof is not clear cut
30. Therefore, even if by coincidence
2
9 Otherwise, if the partial derivatives happen to have opposite signs, the
reaction of the polluter to a change in the damaging consequences of his
economic activities, will be ambigous.
3
0 For a given change in the exogenous parameters, in both cases the
denominators differ. Th terms Q^G and Qg' decrease the denominator and
hence c.p. increase de whereas the term related to the liability effect, 2 Qe g
reduces de compared to the social optimal reaction. In the case of a change
in environmental riskiness, in addition, the numerator will differ in an
ambigous way.
29in some initial equilibrium the damage effect exactly offsets the liability
effect, thereby generating a social optimal level of precaution, the
coincidental optimum will not be sustained.
2. Effects of a Change in the Standard of Regular Operation







Thus, the reaction of the polluter to a tightening of the standard of regular
operation of a plant is ambiguous. The reason for this ambiguity is the
presence of two diverging effects. Whereas an increase of the standard of
normal operation (for given effort level) will unambiguously increases the
probability of being held liable G(n-e), the impact on the marginal
Likelihood g(n-e) in ambiguous. Whether the marginal Likelihood of being
held liable, g (.), will rise or fall when n rises, depends on whether initially
n was smaller or greater than e (cf. Figure 4). Hence, the optimal
precaution level may rise or fall if the standard is tightened.
30FIGURE 4: IMPACT OF A TIGHTENING OF THE STANDARD OF REGULAR OPERATION
s (e,6)
9 (sle)
n, n, e a n, n,
For gn > 0 (n<e), the optimal precautionary effort increases when the
standard of normal operation is tightened. Because the case gn >0 arises,
when n < e, this can be interpreted as overcompliance with the safeguards
of normal operation in the initial equilibrium. If however, gn < 0 ,(n>e),
then two different case have to be considered. The optimal effort level will
increase only if -Qe Gn > | Q p, \, otherwise the surprising result might
occur that the level of precaution taken by the polluter declines when the
standard is tightened. This will be the case of the polluter initially
undercomplied with the standard and the change in n has a smaller
marginal impact on the damage effect than on the liability effect. Hence,
31insufficient precaution by the polluter cannot be corrected be tightening
the standard of normal operation. The precaution level will rise
unambiguously as a consequence of the stricter standard of regular
operation if there is overcompliance initially or if there is
undercompliance and a dominant effect of the change in n on the liability
effect. This result points to the fact that when considering a divergence of
the standard of normal operation from the social optimal level as a policy
option, the environmental policy maker has carefully to distinguish the
relative size of the different effects of a change in-the standard of regular
operation on the damage vis-a-vis the liability effect as well as the
characteristics of the initial equilibrium.
3. The Effects of a Change in Observability of Precaution
The degree of uncertainty in observing the level of precaution constitutes
an important factor in determining the optimal precaution level taken by
the polluting firm. As precaution becomes less precisely observable, the
density function, g(.), becomes flatter. When the distribution is extremely
dispersed, a given change in the level of pollution control will have a
relatively small impact on the Likelihood of being found non-compliant
and, hence, being subject to the causality presumption. In the extreme case,
where a change in precautionary effort has no effect on the probability of
being held liable, the liability effect vanishes all together. In this situation
only the damage effect remains and the level of precaution will decline
unambiguously. On the other hand, the higher -g(n - e) is in absolute terms,
the more pronounced is the liability effect. In models of uncertain
negligence standards, for low degrees of uncertainty a dominating liability
32effect has been established (cf. for example Kolstad, Ulen, Johnson 1990,
Shavell 1987, and Craswell, Calfee 1986)
31.
To analyse the effects of different degrees of uncertainty on the precaution
chosen by the polluting firm, a mean-preserving spread ga is defined for
the density function of possible signals, g(s,e) (cf. Kolstad, Ulen, Johnson
1990)
(13) ga(s, e) = ctg(as + (l-a)e)
The level of precaution perceived according to this distribution differs
from distribution g(s,e). But it has a constant mean value of e, equal to the
precaution level chosen initially. For a > 0 the new density function is well
behaved. For a = 1, both distributions are identical, i.e. ga = g. If a > 1, the
probability mass becomes more concentrated around the mean. Thus, the
degree of uncertainty in observing the true level of precaution diminishes.
For 0 < a < 1 the distribution becomes more dispersed. Evaluating the
first-order condition TC = 0 at the social optimum, where fe = - Qe yields
(14) TC(e*) = fe [1 - Ga(e*-n)] - Q(e*) ga (e*-n)
= fe(e*) [1- Ga(e*-n)] - Q(e*)ag(e*-n) < or > 0 .
where e* denotes the socially optimal precaution level. Kolstad, Ulen and
Johnson 1990, pp. 894ff, conclude that for an increase in a,
(corresponding to a decrease in uncertainty), TC will become negative and
3
1 Notice that in the case of perfect observability of e, the polluter is fully
immunized against liability by choosing the legally prescribed level of
regualr operation.
33hence the optimal precaution level will be higher than the social optimal
level for some low degrees of uncertainty. The analysis, however, neglects
that a mean preserving spread also affects in the cumulated distribution
function G(.). Obviously, a mean-preserving spread will lead to a decrease
in the marginal likelihood of being held liable around the mean, i.e. around
the effort level that was previously optimal. This reduces the liability effect
and ceteris paribus. the effort. On the other hand, a mean-preserving spread
puts more weight on the tails of the distribution (cf. Rothschild, Stiglitz
1979). This implies for the case of the symmetric distributions, that for
given levels of n and e the distribution function of the more dispersed
distribution has higher values of G(.). As G rises, however, damages are
not discounted to the same extent as with a less dispersed density function.
Ceteris paribus, this will cause the effort level to increase. Therefore, the
result obtained by Kolstad, Ulen, and Johnson 1990 only holds for the
region very close to the mean. Only there for a symmetric function the
probability G is approximately constant, whereas marginal likelihood
differ a great deal. Hence, via the liability effect an increase in uncertainty
will unambiguously entail lower precaution. By contrast, at the points
where both distributions intersect, the marginal probability, g, is
unchanged. Then the more dispersed distribution will at the left (the right)
of the two intersection points have an higher (lower) probability G, and
thereby a weaker (stronger) discounting of expected damages which will
increase (decrease) the precaution effort.
34FIGURE 5: THE ROLE OF DIFFERING DEGREES OF UNCERTAINTY
s (e,e)
Thus, the effect of uncertainty on optimal precaution will be ambiguous
even the polluter is risk neutral. The impact will crucially depend on initial
values of precautionary effort e and legally prescribed safeguards of
regular operation n. For very low levels of n, ceteris paribus ga < gb and Gb
> Ga . Hence, precaution will rise with increased uncertainty. For values
moderately lower than the mean, ga>gb and Gb>Ga, if uncertainty increases.
Hence the combined effect is not clear cut. For levels of n moderately
higher than the mean, the precaution level will fall unambiguously as gb<ga
and Ga>Gb if uncertainty increases. For very high values of n the effect is
not clear as gb > ga and Ga >Gb.
35C. Incomplete Regular Operation Standards and Multi-
dimensional Pollution Control
So far, it has been assumed that the potential polluter's precautionary
activities to reduce environmental risks are adequately described by a one-
dimensional variable. Although this assumption has been made to keep the
analysis straightforward, it neglects a substantial problem. When the
polluter faces a whole variety of possible measures to reduce the risk of
emitting dangerous substances to the environment, he has not only to
determine the total precaution effort but also the "optimal combination of
different strategies of pollution control. A standard of regular operation
will typically not be in the position to cover all potential aspects of
preventing current and future environmental damages. The standard of
regular operation tends to be incomplete. If only a subset of risk
management activities is covered by the standard, this will distort the
choice among different pollution control strategies
32.
For instance, it is reasonable to suppose that some pollution control
activities, like the installation of equipment are easier to monitor than
3
2 The interpretation of the activity level as a second strategy to reduce
accident risk, is a special case of the multi-dimensional model presented in
Appendix Al. The allocative inefficiency has been critized by Shavell
1980 in respect to activity level, by Polinsky 1980 in respect to the number
of firms in the industry and the combined output for the case of a
negligence rule. The crucial point is that the polluting firms are not
assigned the full external costs and hence in a general-equilibrium, the
price of the good produced will not reflect its correct scarcity. Essentially,
the conditional reversal of the burden of proof contradicts the polluter-
pays-principle, as the polluter when being found compliant is not assigned
the external costs generated by his economic activities.
36others, such as for example, management techniques, supervision and
training of employees or the carefulness of the workers in charge. The
main effect of an incomplete standard of regular operation is that, if effort
types are observable to differing degrees, a reversal of the burden of proof
sharpens the incentives to exert those effort types for which regular
operation standards are defined. Then a conditional reversal of the burden
of proof might have an adverse effect on the incentives to take
unobservable pollution control measures, for the reason that unobservable
pollution control effort does not influence the probability of being found
the cause of the environmental damage incurred. Thus, a conditional
reversal of the burden of proof might provide stronger incentives for
observed care (depending on which effect dominates the liability or the
damage effect). The incentives to take unobservable effort, however, are
weakened because there only the damage effect prevails. The overall
impact on unobservable precaution will depend also on whether the
relationship between different types of pollution control effort is
substitutive or complementary
33. Effort types are substitutes
(complements) when an increa t in the level of one type leads to higher
(lower) marginal cost of the other type. Depending on whether the liability
or the damage effect dominates in the first instance, this effect might be
reinforced or offset by the interdepence. The distortionary effect will
prevail to an even larger extent if there is no uncertainty involved in
assessing compliance to safeguards of regular operation. With complete no
3
3 The interdependencies between different pollution control strategies can
relate to either the marginal cost of precaution or to the marginal impact on
the expected environmental damage. Both will be influenced by the level
of the other pollution control activities chosen.
37error in assessing compliance to regular operation, the polluter will carry
out precautionary measures which are not included in the standard.
Consequently, in the case of multidimensional pollution control, an
increase in uncertainty in the verification of compliance may actually
improve incentives to take precaution. Thus, when effort-based rules are
used in providing incentives for multi-dimensional pollution control
activities, considerable distortions may arise
34.
D. Assessing the Impact of the Conditional Causality
Presumption
The economic analysis of the provisions contained in the German
Environmental Liability Act has shown that a conditional reversal of the
burden of proof the UmweltHG provides for is not able to ensure the
socially optimal level of precaution. Even if the standard of regular
operation is set at the Pareto-optimal level of precaution, the causality
presumption does not solve the problem of uncertain causation in an
optimal way
35. If precautionary effort taken is only imperfectly observable,
3
4 A brief description of the theoretical framework of the multidimensional
pollution control model is given in Appendix Al. For a more detailed
discussion of the related case of an incomplete standard of negligence see
Bartsch 1995.
3
5 Besides, the conditional reversal of proof involves additional difficulties
which have not been explicitly modelled here. Some of these problems are
related to criticism of negligence liability (cf. for instance Shavell 1980,
1987 Polinsky 1980 or Endres 1991). If polluting firms are heterogeneous,
optimal regular operation standards have -o be defined for every single
polluter (see also the discussion in Shavell 1984). This would require
truthful revelation of firm specific information on costs of precaution to
the policy maker. The polluting firm, though, has a massive interest to
38the polluter will either take insufficient or excessive precaution. It has been
shown, that the induced precaution level taken by the polluting firm
depends on whether the fact that the polluter will escape liability will
outweigh the impact of an higher level of precaution on the probability of
escaping liability.
It can easily be verified that in the framework laid out in this section,
socially optimal precaution will be induced by strict liability rule with a
general reversal of the burden of proof. This result, however, hinges upon
two assumptions: risk neutrality on the part of the polluter and a zero
mean random diffusion process
36. Both of them are rather restrictive. First,
the polluter might be risk averse with respect to the uncertain liability
payments. Secondly, in particular when there is more than one polluter the
background level of environmental pollution might be strictly positive.
Both facts, will be taken into account in the principal-agent model that is
presented in the next section.
misrepresent this information (cf. Emons, Sobel 1991).The most
substantial criticism to the use of a threshold concept, though, remains that
even if under very specific conditions a conditional reversal of the burden
of proof were able to ensure the efficient level of precaution in partial
equilibrium setting, it will not provide the correct incentives with respect
to the activity level, it will not assign the external costs caused to the
polluting firm.
3
6 Note that a fixed background level of pollution that does not affect
marginal damages should in socially optimal prespective not change the
precaution chosen. However, equation (8) indicates for Qy > 0 and Qey = 0,
that de/dy will be positive under the conditional reversal of the burden of
proof. Equation (8) also shows that if the marginal damage level is affected
by some background pollution, the reaction of the polluter will differ from
the socially optimal one.
39III. General Model of Environmental Policy under Asymmetric
Information
This section will derive the optimal environmental policy in a situation
where the pollution control effort chosen by the firm is unobservable. In
the following, a general framework of a principal-agent model of
environmental policy with hidden action will be outlined
37. Moreover, the
implications of the principal-agent paradigm for optimal environmental
policy will highlighted. An optimal policy rule is obtained for a situation
where due to stochastic processes the ultimate impacts of emissions on
environmental quality are uncertain and where the pollution control effort
chosen is not observable. The idea is to devise an institutional framework
that guarantees socially optimal pollution prevention. Using a principal
agent framework allows to explicitly model both aims of liability:
provision of incentives to take adequate precaution and optimal allocation
of environmental risks. Moreover, the principal agent approach takes into
account to two characteristics of environmental pollution: the role of
stochastic factors and the unobservability of the precautionary measures
implemented at the firm level. Moreoover, it takes into account two
constraints often neglected in environmental economics: incentive
compatibility and voluntary participation. Given the information
asymmetry regarding the precaution measures taken by the polluter, the
main difficulty is that of incentive compatibility (see Siebert 1995, pp.
124ff). Therefore, the cost-minimising behaviour of the polluter is a
3
7 The application of principal-agent models to accident liability was first
pointed out by Shavell 1979.
40constraint to the optimisation problem of the environmental policy maker.
Taking into account incentive compatibility makes continuous monitoring
the individual pollution control effort dispensable. In addition to the best
response of the polluter to the incentive scheme, an second condition will
constrain the design of an optimal environmental policy rule. This second
constraint ensures that the polluter will not relocate or close down when
the liability rule is enacted
38. Although, the model does not provide an
explicit framework of locational competition, this second constraint allows
to take into account the international dimension of environmental policy.
Now uncertain causation is considered in the liability rule itself. It will turn
out, that the optimal policy rule obtained in a general principal-agent
framework is crucially determined by a likelihood ratio. This likelihood
ratio is similar to the ex post probability of causation in Shavell's analysis
which determines the optimal proportional liability rule (cf. Shavell 1985).
The ex post probability of causation is given by the probability that an
accident was caused by the polluter (which can be calculated since the
level of precaution is known) divided by the total probability of an
accident (given by the probability that the injurer causes an accident plus
the fixed probability that the accident was caused by the natural factor).
The modified strict liability rule put forward in this study takes up the
general feature of optimal incentive schemes in a principal-agent model
with hidden actions, that optimal outcome based remuneration are
3
8 Is will assumed implicitly, that a benevolent environmental policy maker
does not find it worthwile to implement an environmental policy that will
entail relocation or shutting down of the firm.
41determined by the probability that the effort level desired by the principal
was taken, given the observed outcome, relative to the probability that a
less desired effort level was taken. Although, the discussion will be in
terms of environmental liability, the institutional mechanism of assigning
uncertain external costs to the polluter that will be derived below applies to
a more general setting which attempts to provide precaution incentives
and allocate risk in an optimal way. The incentive scheme can equally, for
instance, represent an a system of ambient immission taxes.
A. The Basic Framework
In setting liability rules, the environmental policy maker acts as the
principal. The potential polluter, being the agent, is able to affect potential
environmental degradation by taking precaution. Neither the policy maker
nor the court or the injured parties can observe actions taken by the
polluting firm with respect to pollution prevention. In order to focus the
analysis on incentive problem on the polluter's part, free-rider problems
among injured parties that would prevent them from bringing cases to trial
when harm is suffered by a large number of individuals are neglected by
restricting the analysis to the case of a bilateral externality. Courts are
assumed to enforce the liability rules perfectly
39. Similarly, costs of
3
9 In the model presented here, there is no difference between the policy
maker, the court and the injurd party in terms of objectives or ability to
observe various variables. The environmental policy maker is not assumed
to have superior information In fact, in many cases it is more realistic that
private individuals have superior information. For example, the injured
party might know better than a central government authority whether the
42litigation are neglected
40. Hence, legal claims will be always asserted. Out-
of-court settlements which might precede the trial itself are disregarded
41.
Likewise, managerial incentive problems within the polluting firm are
neglected (for a discussion the problems involved see Newman, Wright
1990, 1992, Gabel, Sinclair-Desgagne" 1993).
For simplicity, it is assumed that potential victims of environmental
pollution always take the socially optimal level of precaution. Although
some authors consider explicitly the level of precaution taken by the
potentially injured party (cf. for example Endres 1989, Shavell 1987), in
the case of environmental problems, risk reduction by the pollutees seems
to be of minor importance and is, therefore, ignored. For the sake of
simplicity, information problems other than the unobservability of the
precaution taken are neglected. The potential polluter is assumed to face a
known distribution uncertain liability payments
42. It will be assumed that
injurer has taken sufficient precaution. Then, the additional issue arises as
to whether this superior information is verifiable in litigation.
4
0 Models with costly litigation are discussed by P'ng 1987, Polinsky,
Rubinfeld 1988, and Hylton 1990.
4
1 Note that in in particular in presence of uncertain outcomes of the trial
which might be due to uncertain interpretation of the evidence by the
court, disputants might prefer an out ot court settlement in order to avoid
the costs involved of the trial. For a discussion of settlement behaviour see
Landes 1971, Posner 1973, and Shavell 1982. Game-theoretic models of
pretrial bargaining have been developed by P'ng 1983, Ordover,
Rubinstein 1986, Bebschuk 1984. In addition to potential savings of legal
cost, settlement transforms uncertain outcome of the trial into a
deterministic distribution of the efficiency gain arising from intemalisation
of external costs.
4
2 Emons, Sobel 1991, 1990 have investigated the problem of unknown
cost of precaution when agents are non-identical.
43the environmental policy maker knows cost of pollution control of the
polluter. Despite the fact that environmental economists have long
recognised the lack of information about the cost of pollution control
(Kneese 1964, Baumol, Oates 1975), models of asymmetric information
are generally adopted by environmental economists only to a very limited
extent. The extraction of private information from self-interested
individuals is closely related to the revelation approach in mechanism
design (cf. Emons 1993). The problem then is to design a scheme which
induces polluting firms to reveal the true cost of pollution abatement (cf.
Kwerel 1977). Dasgupta, Hammond, Maskin 1980 look at the problem of
truthful revelation of private information on abatement cost in a Groves-
Clarke-Vickrey setting. Conrad 1991 looks at a situation where the
regulator can obtain information on abatement cost in an iterative process
of setting an emission tax. Baron 1985, Spulber 1988, and Laffont 1994
derive optimal regulation for a pollution generating monopolist Ellis 1992
applies the notion of linear implementation by Laffont, Tirole, 1986 to
optimal regulation of environmental pollution. The analysis also assumes
that the true harm suffered by the injured party can be asserted
43.
The stylised timing of the interaction between the environmental policy
maker, the polluter and the court can be thought of as follows. In the first
step, the environmental policy maker determines the liability rule. Given
the liability rule, the polluter chooses the precaution measures which are
optimal from his point of view. Precautionary efforts affect both the
probability of an environmental accident and the magnitude of
4
3 Mistakes in determining the effects of damages are analysed by Kaplow,
44environmental degradation. Nature moves next
44, drawing a state of the
world from a known probability distribution which is unobservable for the
policy maker and the court likewise
45. This random variable, 9 e 0,
describes the stochastic factors that might affect the actual level of
environmental degradation for a given level of precautionary efforts, with
9 being distributed according to a density function h(9)
46. Precautionary
efforts in pollution control and the random influence determine the actual
environmental damage q(e;6). Depending on this publicly observed
environmental damage level, compensatory payments are awarded
according to liability rules set initially. The time structure is depicted in
Figure 6.
Shavell 1993, Ben-Shahar, Randow 1993, Emons 1990, Polinsky 1987 .
4
4 If the polluter could acquire information in the random influence before
choosing a precaution level, he would be in the position to condition the
precautionary effort on this observation. In this setting the policy maker
has to provide appropriate ince tives in order to induce truthful revelation
of the private information, (for an overview see Mas-Colell, Whinston,
Green 1995, 488ff).
4
5 In order to have a meaningful information asymmetry in the model, it is
necessary that this stochastic influence cannot be observed. For the
nonobservability of the precautionary choice to have substantial
consequences, it must not be possible to deduce the precaution chosen
from the level of environmental damages incurred. Hence, it is assumed
that the level of precaution taken affects environmental damages, but it
does not fully determine them. Otherwise, the missing information on
precaution could be inferred from observing the stochastic factor and the
damage.
4
6 As it is conventional in this type of model, it is assumed that both the
environmental policy maker and the polluting firm form homogenous
expectations regarding this probability distribution h(9).
45FIGURE 6: STYLISED TIMING OF THE MODEL
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In the case of multiple emission sources contributing to the same ambient
concentration of pollutants, the distribution of environmental damages will
also depend on preventive pollution control action taken by other emitters.
The presence of other emittors would not change the results qualitatively,
provided that each polluter takes the emission level of all other emitters as
exogenously given. Here, it is assumed that individual polluters do not
choose their precaution level strategicly vis-a-vis each other. Thus, it
analysis abstracts from srategic interdependence of precaution levels in the
generation of environmental damages (even not in the simplest form of a
Nash-conjecture). As long as one abstracts from possible strategic
interaction among emission sources, team production problem does not
arise (cf. Segerson 1988).
The environmental policy maker minimises the expected net welfare loss
due to uncompensated environmental damages. This net welfare loss
depends on the environmental damage, q, and liability payments, 1, it can
extract from polluters as compensation for the harm suffered by the injured
46party
47. The actual welfare loss to the environmental policy maker for a
certain realisation of 8 is a given by
(15) v = v(q(e;e)-l(q)) = q(e;e)-l(q)
where q(e;8) indicates the actual environmental damage and 1(.) are
liability payments the victim will be awarded by the court. If not stated
otherwise, the policy maker is assumed to be risk neutral (i.e. V < 0, V" =
0)
48, and his expected welfare loss is
(16) V(q,l) = Ev(q,l) = Q(e)-l(Q).
Hence, the net welfare loss due to potential environmental pollution is the
difference between environmental damages and the monetary
4
7 The compensation awarded by the court can either be redistributed to
them or spent according to the victim's preferences.
4
8 Risk-neutrality on the part of the environmental policy maker constitutes
a stronger than necessary assumption. All that is required in order to
generate the same qualitative results is that the environmental authority is
less risk averse than the polluting firm. This will be the case if the potential
damage and hence the liability payments are relatively large compared to
the net assets of the polluting firm. The victims suffering from the damage
to environment may according to the Arrow-Lind-Theorem are in a better
position to diversify risk (Am .v, Lind 1970, Fisher 1973). Likewise, it
might easier to obtain first party insurance in case of environmental
damages, since in first party insurance typically no moral hazard problem
arises. Note, however, that with a risk averse principal additional problems
arise in justifying the technical framework that will be used later. In the
context of the technical problems involved, the assumption of risk
neutrality is not completely trivial. The role of risk aversion on the part of
the policy maker is also discussed in Appendix A3.
47compensation received from polluters
49. Liability payments are a function
of the environmental damage incurred
50.
This objective function differs from the one that is usually assumed in a
partial equilibrium analysis, where the policy maker is assumed to
minimise total environmental costs which consist of the environmental
damages and the cost of controlling emissions. In a principal-agent setting,
by contrast, the policy maker minimises the net loss to victims which
equals the part of environmental damages that is not compensated for by
the polluter. This does not mean, however, that costs of precaution are
neglected in the optimisation problem. The costs of pollution control are
taken into account in the optimisation problem by means of the constraints.
These constraints, as will be discussed in detail below, differ from those of
a standard partial equilibrium problem in environmental economics. Both
approaches will, in the absence of information asymmetry, lead to the same
the necessary conditions for an optimal environmental policy.
Thus, the polluting firm bears total costs that are a function of the cost of
preventive pollution control, f(e), and the expected disutility due to
uncertain liability payments for environmental damages, u (l(q(e,0))).
4
9 As it will be explained in detail below, in the framework used here the
environmental policy maker will take into account the costs of pollution
control because of the constraints he faces when determining the optimal
environmental policy rule.
5
0 There might, however, exist considerable problems in observing the
damage incurred. Therefore, some authors have suggested that the
incentive scheme to depend on observed pollutant concentration ambient
in environmental media (see Siebert 1995, 124 or Xepapadeas 1991). This
may be a practical approach for instruments such as ambient taxes.
48(17) C = E c(l (q),e) = f(e) + E u (l(q(e,e))
with u
1 > 0 u" > 0. The cost imposed on the firm by uncertain liability for
environmental damages is denoted by u(l(d)). Since the firm is assumed to
be risk averse, due to Jensen's inequality these costs will be greater than
expected liability payments
51. The disutility attached to liability payments
is a convex function. The reason for the being that environmental damages
and hence liability payments often involve figures that are significant
compared to the net assets of the polluting firm. It is assumed, that there
does not exist a perfect insurance market for environmental liability
claims. Insuring environmental liability faces the same kind of information
asymmetry as discussed here. The insurance company will also not be able
to observe the precaution level. In this case the insurance premium will
typically be higher than the expected loss. Carrying out pollution control
activities involves some cost to the* polluting firm. With respect to the
disutility of effort function of the polluter, f(e), it is assumed that the costs
of precaution increases if effort increases. The cost function is again
assumed to be strictly convex (i.e. marginal cost increase with increasing
effort level), that is fe > 0, fw > 0. Both, the environmental policy maker
5
1 One simple way of stating Jensen's Inequality is, that for a convex
function the expectation of the function is greater than the function of
expectations (cf. Varian 1992, 182). Notice that the familiar concave utility
function of income for a risk averse individual for negative values of
income in the third quardrant, i.e. costs, corresponds to a convex cost or
disutility function in the first quardrant.
49and the polluting firm, minimise their expected utility loss according to the
Bernoulli-Principle
52.
Higher precaution levels lead to a stochastically lower environmental
damage. Recall that the environmental damage, Q(.), is a strictly convex,
downward sloping function of e, so the marginal effect on environmental
damage diminishes if the level of effort is increased. Hence, Qe < 0 and Qee
B. The Optimisation Problem of the Environmental Policy
Maker
Following the so-called first-order approach, it will be assumed that the set
of feasible precaution and damages levels are an interval of 9t, such e e E
c 9t and q e Q c 9i
5
3 The damage function q(e;0) is rather complicated to
handle technically. Therefore, frequently an approach is chosen which
defines where environmental damages as a random variable. Random
environmental damages are described by a density function parametrised
by the precaution level taken by the polluter. This parametrised
5
2 For a critique of expected utility theory cf. Machina 1987. Implications
for environmental economics are discussed in the volume collected by
Bromley, Segerson 1992.
5
3 See Holmstrom 1979 or Shavell 1979 for the general exposition of the
frist-order approach in terms of employment contracts, and Grossman, Hart
1983, Rogerson 1985 and Jewitt 1988 for its limitations. The technical
difficulties, first pointed out by Mirrless 1974, that arise when there are
infinitely many outcomes will be diregarded here.
50distribution can easily be derived, knowing the damage function q(e;0) and
density function of the random factor, h(6). Let H(qie) denote the
corresponding distribution function. As the marginal environmental
damage decreases when precaution is increased (qe < 0), it follows that He
(qle) > 0. A higher level of precaution will increase the probability that
only damages up to a given size occur. This means, that a higher level of
precautionary effort will shift the distribution function to the left in sense
that the former distribution first-order stochastic dominates the new one
54.
The support of the distribution function, has to remain unchanged by
variations in the precaution level. Otherwise, the information asymmetry
vanishes in the sense that for some damage level the precaution level the
polluter has taken can be inferred. The effect of precaution on the
respective functions is depicted in Figure 7.
5
4 A distribution Fi dominates a distribution F2 iff Fj(x) < F2(x) for all x,
with a strict inequality for some x.







The environmental policy maker's optimisation problem can be stated as
follows. The policy maker minimises total expected welfare loss of
environmental risk by choosing a liability rule l(q) and (implicitly by
anticipating the polluter's best response) an effort level, e. For notional
simplicity the lower and upper limits of integration are suppressed.
52(18) min V = Ev = j (q(e,9)- I(q(e,6))h(9)d0
e
= jQ q - l(q)h(q\e)dq
In presence of information asymmetry the subsequent cost minimising
behaviour of the polluter has to be taken into account by the environmental
policy maker. Consequently, the first constraint to the minimisation
problem of the policy maker is the incentive compatibility of the policy
rule. To put it differently, the incentive compatibility constraint, which
ensures that the polluting firm finds it in his own interest to take the
precaution level desired by environmental policy maker.
e e argmin {E(u(l(q)) +f(e)} =




The second crucial feature ct the principal-agent framework is that
participation in the incentive scheme is voluntary. In terms of
environmental policy, voluntary participation reflects the fact that the
government's coercive power in implementing environmental policies is
limited because polluting firms can choose ot relocate or to cease
operation. Therefore, in addition to incentive compatibility, the
environmental policy maker has to take into account that in an increasingly
integrated world economy with international factor mobility, the
53introduction of a liability act might cause the polluter to relocate
55. The
polluting firm usually has some opportunity outside the jurisdiction where
an environmental policy is introduced.
Hence, the second constraint on the set of feasible policy rules is so-called
participation constraint (cf. Arrow 1986). The participation constraint
stresses the fact that tightening of environmental standards can lead to
relocation of environmentally dirty industries to jurisdictions with less
strict environmental standards with regard to allowable emissions or safety
regulations (for a more detailed discussion of international aspects of
environmental policy, see Rauscher 1995, 1992, 1991, Siebert 1991,
Siebertetal. 1980).
(20) (PC) ju(l(q))h(q\e)dq + f(e)<m
Q
The participation constraint ensures that, if the polluter chooses the
optimal precaution level, expected costs including disutility from bearing
uncertain liability payments, do not exceed some exogenous reservation
5
5 Without loss of generality, the bargaining over the liability law can be
understood as game with symmetric information where the policy maker is
in the position to commit to a take-it-or-leave-it offer. In equilibrium, the
polluting firm will accept the liability nil and will choose the optimal
precaution level, given the rule. This, however, does not imply that the
policy maker has all of the bargaining power. The relative bargaining
strength can be indicated by the reservation utility level of the polluting
firm.
54cost level
56. This reservation cost level is determined by the best
alternative opportunity
57, the polluter would have to face outside the
jurisdiction currently enacting the liability rule. Obviously in a world of
perfectly mobile factors of production, if the costs imposed on the polluter
by environmental policy at the given location are higher than those that
arise elsewhere, the polluting firm will choose to relocate. Locational
choice is determined by international differences in environmental policy
and the cost of relocation. The possibility to enforce the polluter-pays-
principle, therefore, also depends upon the outsicie option of the polluting
firm. Note that if the optimal incentive compatible environmental policy at
the present location cannot entail lower expected disutility than m, it is
optimal that the polluter relocates. The extent to which environmental
policy can assign external costs to polluters in a situation of locational
competition is determined by the cost of changing location and the
environmental policy abroad. Changes in the relative location advantage of
5
6 If instead a two country model is considered, the reservation utility level
may not be an exogenous parameter, but an endogenous variable
depending on the environmental policy pursued by the home country.
There is a rapidly growing literature on strategic environmental policy (cf.
Ulph, and Ulph 1994, Barrett 1994 and Conrad 1993 among others). In the
context of principal-agent theory, so called common agency models have
been developed, which look at a siuation where multiple principals aim at
influencing the actions taken b^ a single common agent (cf. Bernheim,
Whinston 1986, and Stole 1991). Attraction of firms in locational
competition might be such an action.
5
7 The parameter m can also be interpreted as the primary distribution of
property rights. The victims-pays-principle would correspond to m=0,
whereas the polluter-pays-principle corresponds to the full external costs
including abatement in another industry of the economy or in the same
industry in another country.
55a country under mobility of firms across national boundaries correspond to
changes in comparative advantage of internationally immobile firms,
which are mobile between different sectors of the economy. Therefore, the
reservation cost level, m, can also be interpreted as the environmental
protection costs the firm would have to face in another sector of the same
economy. In evaluating different locations, many factors play a role.
Moreover, locational decisions are heavily driven by expectations of future
developments of environmental policy at home and abroad, and potential
technical progress in pollution control technologies. In accordance with the
empirical evidence, it is assumed here that costs induced by environmental
regulation are of minor importance compared to other location factors (cf.
e.g. Tobey 1990, Hettige, Lucas, Wheeler, 1992, Klepper 1994). Equally,
one could suppose that the cost of industrial delocation are substantial such
that the polluter-pays-principle can be enforced. It will be assumed that the
special case, where the policy maker actually finds it advantageous that the
polluter relocates productive activities abroad does not arise
58.
5
8 A participation constraint on the part of the environmental policy maker
would capture a similar overall optimaiity constraint of the policy maker
according to which the net welfare loss due to uncompensated harm from
pollution should exceed the net benefit of consumption of the good
generating emissions in its production. The reservation utility of the
principal is usually disregarded as he offers the incentive scheme which he
will only do to his own advantage.
56C. Optimal Allocation of Environmental Risk in Absence of
Incentive Problems
By assuming for a moment that the precautionary effort by the polluter
does not influence the distribution of uncertain environmental damages,
the following analysis allows to focus on optimal sharing of environmental
risk between the polluter and the victim. If only the operation of the
environmentally risky plant but not precaution taken affects the
distribution of uncertain environmental damages, the polluter should not
take precaution. Therefore the costs of precaution, f(e), can be neglected in
the following discussion of optimal risk-sharing.
The liability rule is assumed to consist of two branches: l(q, k) = l(q) + k.
The fixed amount, k, can be thought of as an ex ante compensation for
increased risk exposure. The fixed payment can be used to finance a fund
which is responsible for compensation of victims which were not able to
be compensated by liability payments.Only the variable amount l(q)
depends on the actual environmental damage incurred. This variable part
represents ex post liability for environmental damages. Conditions for
optimal risk sharing can be derived by minimising the net welfare loss due
to uncompensated environmental damages Ev(q -l(q)) subject to the
participation constraint Eu(l(q)) < m
59. This yields the foiling first-order
condition for the optimal liability rule,
5
9 As l(q) is contingent on the realisation of the random variable 9, the
first-order condition depends on actual rather that expected marginal
utilities. See Raiffa 1968 for a more detailed discussion.
57(21)
where \i is the Lagrangian-multiplier on the participation constraint, with (I
> 0. The sign of the Lagrangian mulitplier follows from the second-order
condition for a minimum v"(q -l(q) +jiu"(l(q)) > 0 and the signs of the
second derivatives of the utility functions v",u" > 0. Differentiating the
first-order condition for the optimal ex post liability rule with respect to
the damage incurred gives
(22) l=-
V
with lq denoting the partial derivative of the optimal liability rule with
respect to q. Equation (22) highlights the importance of the curvature of
the respective disutility functions for the optimal allocation of risks. As
regards the second derivatives of the disutility functions, there are four
different cases to be distinguished. These are summarised in the following
Table.









lq=l,l(.) = q + k
risk averse (u" > 0)
lq = o, 1(.)= k
0<lq<l,
l(.)*q+k,l(q)*k
If lq = 0, the polluter will not be held liable at all for the damages incurred.
He will only have to pay a fixed amount ex ante. If lq =1, by contrast, the
polluter is strictly held liable of the full damage actually incurred. When
both, polluter and policy maker are risk averse, the environmental risk will
be truly shared between them. The optimal allocation of environmental risk
depends on the relative magnitudes of the second derivatives v" and u".
Consequently, the polluter will only be held liable for some portion of
realised damages. If the policy maker is risk neutral, a risk averse polluter
will be fully insured against the risk of environmental degradation. Thus,
the polluter is fully insured against all stochastic influence that might
affect the extent of environmental degradation. In this case the polluter will
only have to pay a fixed amount k. On the other hand, if the polluter is risk
neutral, he will be fully liable ex post of any occurring damage, and the
optimal liability rule will be l(q,k)=q +k. The fixed amount k which the
59polluter has to pay is determined by the participation constraint
60. In the
case where both are risk neutral, the optimal apportioning of risk is not
uniquely determined. Thus for the case presented in the previous section,
that is a risk neutral environmental policy maker and a risk averse polluter,
the polluter should not be held liable at all ex post. This, however, does not
imply that the polluter can use the environment as a receptacle of wastes
free of charge.
D. Optimal Environmental Policy when Precaution is
Observable
Before deriving the characteristics of the optimal environmental policy
under asymmetric information in the next section, this section will
establish the optimal policy in absence of informational constraints as a
reference situation. If the precautionary effort chosen by the polluter is
perfectly and costlessly observable, the environmental policy maker can
enforce the Pareto-optimal level of precaution by imposing a sufficiently
heavy severe sanctions in the case that the polluter does not comply with
the legal standard. Baseing the incentive scheme on the effort level allows
to obtain optimal risk sharing.
When the precaution level is observable the optimal policy is determined
by minimising the expected net welfare loss due to pollution subject to
the participation constraint of the polluter, i.e.
(23) min Ev[ q(e) - l(q(e,0)]
6
0 Note that the fixed amount will vary with the ex post liability.
60s.t. Eu[l(q(.))] + f(e) < m
Since precaution can be observed, incentive compatibility is not a
constraint on optimisation problem of the environmental policy maker.
Again, the first-order condition for the optimal liability rule can be
obtained by differentiating the Lagrangian with respect to liability
payments, 1,
(24) -v
I(q-l(q)) + ^u'(l(q)) = 0.
with u"> 0, |i > 0 denoting again the Lagrangian-multiplier on the
participation constraint. Since the policy maker is assumed to be risk
neutral (v' = constant), liability payments do not vary with realised
damages (lq = 0). Thus, if precautionary efforts are observable is is
optimal not to impose any ex post liability for occurring damages.
However, this does not imply that the polluter can use the environment as a
receptacle of waste free of charge. The result just established only states
that if precaution is observable, there should not be any ex post liability for
occurring damages if the polluter is risk averse. This result corresponds to
the full insurance of a risk ave se polluter by a risk neutral policy maker
derived in the previous section: If the environmental policy dictates the
polluter's choice of precautionary effort and there no problem as to
providing incentives, the risk neutral policy maker should bear the
environmental risk. It is optimal to levy a fixed ex ante payment on the
polluter. The optimal ex ante compensation for environmental risk is
determined by the fact that, if the polluter chooses the level of precaution
that the policy maker wants him to choose, the participation constraint has
to be satisfied with equality i.e. k = m - f(e). Hence, given that the
61environmental policy can be specified in terms of the precaution level, e,
the polluter will be required to pay a fixed amount k, such that he will have
to carry exactly his reservation cost level.
Considering the level of precautionary effort the policy maker wants the
polluting firm to take, under optimal risk-sharing, the effort level can be
obtained by substituting the constant liability payment, k, into the
Lagrangian and differentiating with respect to effort level, e. This yields
the following first-order condition for the optimal precaution level
(25) Qe + Hfe = 0 •
Hence, the policy maker will set the legal standard such that the marginal
expected damage prevented equals the marginal cost of precaution
(weighted by the shadow cost of inducing the polluter to participate). This
precaution level is the unconstrained Pareto-optimal (or first-best) effort
level e* which can ne implemented with perfect information regarding the
precaution level. The first-best level of precaution is determined by the
equality of marginal expected environmental damage prevented and the
marginal cost of precaution.
Due to risk aversion of the polluter, an effon based scheme is preferable to
an outcome based incentive scheme being subject to random influences. In
terms of environmental liability, one effort-based incentive scheme is a
negligence rule
61. The traditional analysis of environmental liability shows
6lWith the difference that here, however the polluter has to pay a fixed
amount, whereas under a negligence rule he only has to cover his costs of
precaution.
62(cf. Endres 1991), that it is usually sufficient to impose the full damage
costs in the case where the polluter has not taken due care e*
62. Under a
negligence rule the polluter bears the cost of precaution and is fully
insured against environmental risk, provided that he has taken due care.
The risk of random environmental damages is borne by the risk neutral
policy maker (victims). If it turns out that the polluting firm has not chosen




l(q, k) = q + k if e<e*
Achieving a first best solution, however, will not be possible, since
typically the precautionary measures taken are at least to some degree
private information to the polluter.
E. The Optimal Policy Rule with Unobservable Precaution
The first-best environmental policy described in the previous section
accomplishes two objectives. It specifies optimal precaution to be taken by
the polluting firm, and it provides full insurance against random
environmental degradation. When the precautionary choice it not
6
2 This result is highly sensitive towards the fact that very deviation from
due care will be detected. If this is not the case the sanctions imposed
when found negligent have to be adjusted upwards (see Polinsky, Shavell
1979, Cohen 1987).
63observable, though, these two objectives will often be in conflict. The
reason for this trade-off between risk sharing and providing precautionary
incentives is that the only way to induce the polluter to take precaution is
to hold him liable for the environmental damages incurred. These
environmental damages, however, are random.
The first-order approach replaces incentive compatibility constraint (IC) by
the first-order condition that the polluter's total expected cost function is
stationary with respect to e
63. Under the assumption that we can
differentiate through the integral, the first-order condition for a cost-
minimum of the polluting firm can be written as
(27) (FC) \u(l(q))he(q\e)dq+fe =0
Q
where he denotes the partial derivative of the density function with respect
to e.
Pointwise minimisation of the welfare loss to the policy maker (i.e.
minimisation for every q) with respect to the optimal liability payments
subject to constraints (FC) and (PC), gives the following necessary
conditions for every qe Q,
(28) - h{q\ e) + fid (l(q))h (q\ e)+X it (l(q)he (q\ e) = 0
Derivation of the Lagrangian with respect to the effort level yields
6
3 The conditions under which this procedure is legitimate are discussed in
the Appendix.
64(29) j (q - l{q))he (q\ e)dq + A (J u{l{q))hee (q\ e)dq + fee (e) = 0
Q Q
Again \i is the Lagrangian-multiplier on the participation constraint and the
X the multiplier on the first-order constraint (FC).
These two conditions together with the first-order condition (FC) and the
binding participation constraint (PC)
(20') (PC) ju(l(q))h(q\e)dq + f(e) -m = 0
Q
determine the solution to the optimisation problem of the environmental
policy maker. As to the binding participation constraint (PC), it is well
known from principal-agent theory that under the optimal contract the
expected utility of the agent has to equal the reservation utility (cf.
Hermalin 1993). If a given effort level is implementable
64; the optimal
incentive contract will just satisfy the participation constraint. If the
incentive scheme does not satisfies the participation constraint, another
64Note that, it is assumed that all precaution levels are implementable,
which is not necessarily the case. A level of precaution is only
implementable, if there exists no pollution control strategy for the polluter
that induces the same density over observable damages and which is less
costly in terms of cost of pollution control. The intuition of this is the
following: If there were such a strategy - one that produced the same
expected liability payments as the one the environmental policy maker
wants to implement, but which cost the polluter less than the one the
environmental policy maker wants to implement, then it is clearly
impossible to implement that strategy. Therefore, the density over outcome
induced by different effort levels in pollution control have to be distinct
from each other (see Grossman, Hart 1983 for a discussion of the existence
of an solution).
65incentive scheme would exist that ensures incentive compatibility, but
involves higher liability payments for every observed level of damage that
occurs. This implies a lower uncompensated damage and hence a higher
level utility for the environmental policy maker. Therefore, the original
liability rule has not been optimal. This implies that the cost assigned to
the polluting firm, are equal to those the firm would have to face on other
countries. Thus, the binding participation constraint corresponds loosely
speaking to an equilibrium condition in locational arbitrage.
Thus, we have a system of four equations (28),(29), (FC) and (PC) and
four unknowns: l,e,A, , and \i. The optimal liability rule is determined by
(28), the corresponding precaution level by (FC). The Lagrangian
multipliers are given by the adjoint equation (29) and (PC), respectively.
Notice that, the solution specifies the optimal liability rule as a function
solely of the damage incurred. Thus, the type of liability rule considered
here is a strict, i.e. non-fault based, liability. Although, in general, the
specific form of this rule will depend on many factors, some conclusions
can be drawn. In general, the results obtained in hidden action models of
worker compensation are confirmed for this reformulated model of
environmental policy. Rearranging terms in the equation determining the
optimal liability rule yields the following condition for the optimal liability
rule
(28, h(q\e)
In order to draw some conclusions of how the LHS of equation (I
1) and
therefore liability payments, l(q), will vary with the RHS (and in particular
66with the likelihood ratio), the signs of the Lagrangian-multipliers have to
be determined. From the optimal risk sharing result, it is clear that (LI, the
policy maker's shadow price on the participation constraint, which
indicates the increase in the policy maker's welfare loss from a marginal
decrease in the reservation cost level, is positive.
Holmstrom 1979, p. 90, shows for the problem managerial compensation
that A, > 0. This, however, does not follow immediately, for the case
environmental policy discussed here. In contrast, it can be shown that
under certain conditions X will be negative
65. The signs of the Lagrangian
multipliers can be used to derive some insight into the optimal
environmental policy rule. A binding incentive compatibility constraint
implies that liability payments cannot be fixed. Hence, a binding incentive
compatibility constraint requires a deviation from optimal risk-sharing.
For X < 0, equation (I
1) indicates that, the LHS of equation (I
1) has to
increase above \i when he < 0 and vice versa. The LHS increases in turn, if
u
1 decreases, which it does if liability payments decrease. The precise way
6
5 Applying Lemma 1 of Jewitt 1988 shows that, if u is an increasing
convex function and fe> 0, then any X satisfying (FC) and (1) is negative.
The reason for this is, that substituting (1) into (FC) gives
f («(/te))(_l— - n)h(q\e)dq = #, J u (l(q))
Using the fact that the expectation of he(qle)/h(qle) = 0 gives
The LHS of the first equation is simply the covariance of u and 1/u' which
is equal to Xfs. Since u and u' are monotone in opposite directions, they
have a non-positive covariance, and since fe is positive by assumption, it
follows that X < 0.
67in which optimal liability payments will relate to the realised damage level,
crucially depends on the likelihood ratio. It will depend on whether, given
the distribution function, if a certain damage level is observed it is
relatively more likely that the polluter has taken appropriate precaution
than that he has not taken appropriate precaution. Thus, liability payments
decrease in states where the damage level incurred whose probability is
decreased if precaution is increased (he<0). On the other hand, when a
decrease in precaution raises the probability of a damage level to occur,
liability payments have to increase. The environmental policy rule will
require the polluter to cover less environmental damages for levels of
damages incurred that are statistically more likely to occur when a
sufficient level of precaution was chosen. Similarly, liability payments will
be higher for damage levels that are relatively more likely to occur when
insufficient precaution was taken. Although, an intuitive interpretation of
the results derived involves statistical inference, the policy maker (and the
court), knows exactly which precaution level was chosen given the liability
rule from (FC). The peculiar form of the environmental policy rules is due
to incentive compatibility. By structuring liability payments in this way,
the environmental policy maker ensures that the polluter will take an
appropriate level of precaution. Moreover, the relationship depends on the
nature of the utility function. For simplicity, it has been assumed that v'=
1. If this assumption is relaxed, the results become even more blurred.
In general, there is a deviation of the liability payments from Pareto-
optimal risk sharing which would imply a constant liability payment. This
deviation is due to the trade-off between providing incentives to take
precaution and sharing the risk involved optimally. In general, it will be
68optimal to hold the polluter strictly liable for part of the occurring
damages. A partial strict liability rule trades-off optimal risk allocation
and incentives to take precaution. The optimal structure of liability
payments will depend on the relative probabilities that, given the
observation of a damage level, the desired precaution level has been taken.
The very general form of the liability rule derived above, leads to a
somewhat surprising implication, that the optimal liability payments will
not necessarily increase monotonically with the level of environmental
damages incurred. Hence, it can not be taken as certain that higher levels
of environmental degradation will entail higher liability payments (cf.
Grossman, Hart 1983). For the optimal liability payments to increase with
the level of observed damages, the likelihood ratio has to be decreasing in
q. This means that it is relatively more likely for a higher (lower)
environmental damage level to occur when a low (higher) level of
precaution was taken. This property is known as the Monotone Likelihood
Ratio Property (cf. Milgrom 1981), and it is not implied by first-order
stochastic dominance. Fortunately, the conditions under which the first-
order approach used in this section is legitimate imply that liability
payments rise with observed damages (cf. Appendix).
Condition (1') also implies that the optimal liability rule is not likely to
have a simple form. The particular form of the liability rule is driven by the
informational content of various damage levels incurred. The likelihood
ratio will often not vary in a simple manner with observed damages. Only
in some special cases, more intuitive solutions can be obtained:
69- When the incentive compatibility constraint does not bind (i.e. X - 0),
and there are no conflicting interests between the policy maker and the
polluting firm, the polluter has to pay a fixed fee depending the multiplier
on the participation constraint
66. This case can arise if the precaution level
the policy maker wants to implement is also the least costly one from the
point of view of the polluting firm. This can occur, if production costs can
be reduced by adopting environmentally friendly technologies. Even if
carrying out some environmental protection may be cost reducing at the
firm level, the precaution level minimising private costs will in general not
be the same as the one minimising social costs.
- The case where the precautionary effort taken has no effect on expected
environmental damage (he (qle)= 0) has already been discussed in the
previous section in the context of optimal risk-sharing for the absence of
incentive problems.
- If the polluting firm is risk neutral (u" = 0) and has sufficient assets to
cover damages, a full strict liability with a complete coverage of all
occurring damages by the polluter is optimal. According to optimal risk-
sharing a risk neutral polluter can be assigned full strict liability for all
occurring damages. The polluter is simply held liable for all occurring
damages, although they may not to the full extent be caused by his
6
6 Note that, if the polluter is risk averse, in order to achieve Pareto-optimal
risk sharing the RHS of (1') has to be constant (u"=0). This would imply
that he/h is constant, imlying that Jhe = Jh= const., Since J h =1 per
definition, it would follows that he = 0. This contradicts the assumption
He>0 for some q. Thus, optimal risk sharing, is only feasible if A^=0 (cf.
Borch 1962, Holmstrom 1979).
70emissions
67. The reason is that when the polluter is risk neutral, there is no
conflict between risk allocation and setting incentives for precaution. A
risk averse polluter, by contrast, when held fully liable for uncertain
environmental damages, would respond by carrying out excessive
precaution. In the case of the polluter being risk averse, optimal risk
sharing would imply full insurance of polluters against the risk of being
held liable for randomly caused damages. Then, however, the incentive to
take precaution disappear. This, is the well known phenomenon of moral
hazard.
The preceding analysis only enables to derive very general results as to the
optimal liability rule. Although, conditions were established under which
liability payments will vary with observed damages, the exact specification
of liability payment depending on observed damages is heavily driven the
underlying distribution function. Therefore, it is not possible (without
knowing the specific characteristics of the likelihood ratios) to derive
regularities for optimal liability rules. Even when the monotonicity result
can be established, we still do not have an explicit rule for apportioning
6
7 In section 3.3, it has been shown that l(q) = q+k is an optimal risk
allocation. Since the participation constraint binds at the optimal liability
rule and for a risk neutral polluter Eu(l(q)) = El(q) the expected disutility
attached to uncertain liability payments equal the expected liability
payments. Hence, expected liability payments have to equal the cost level
attached to the outside option, m, minus the cost of precaution, i.e. El(q,9)
+ f(e) = m or El(q) =m - f(e). Then, if the liability rule is l(q) = q + k, the
polluter will minimise E(q+k) +f(e) = Eq + f(e) + k. This does not differ
from the optimisation problem the policy maker of minimising Ev = Eq -
El(q) = Eq - m + f(e). If k=- Eq(e
FB) - f(e
re) + m first-best solution can be
attained. This is due to min E(q+k) +f(e) = Eq+f(e) +k +m-m=Eq-El(q) +k-
m.
71realised environmental damages between the polluter and the injured party.
Such an explicit relation between the actual level of damages and the
liability payments will be derived in a simplified version of the hidden
action model of environmental policy that is presented in the next section.
IV. A Simplified Model of Environmental Liability under
Asymmetric Information
The previous analysis has shown that, the general principal-agent model
with unobservable precaution of the polluting firm does not allow to
derive explicit conclusions about the specific form the optimal incentive
scheme. The structure of the optimal incentive scheme was highly sensitive
concerning any change in the underlying probability distribution.
However, results which have a more intuitive economic interpretation can
be obtained by using a linear model (cf. Varian 1992, pp 453ff). Linear
incentive schemes exhibit some very convenient properties. Firstly, linear
schemes are fairly robust. If, for example, the underlying distribution
function is not exactly known, the incentive mechanism should still be
optimal. The same is true if the agent has a somewhat richer set of possible
actions at his disposal than the model takes into consideration (as for
example in the case of multidimensional pollution control which is
discussed in section II.3). Furthermore, linear incentive schemes are easily
specified and understood even if individuals only have bounded
information processing capacities. Hence, transaction costs involved in
designing such schemes are limited. For these reasons, in reality linear
compensation schemes are frequently used (cf. Schmutzler 1996, 253,
footnote 8).
72Starting out from the empirical observation that compensation scheme
actually observed in reality are often relatively simple compared to the
optimal incentive scheme that are obtained in a principal-agent model like
the one studied in the previous section, Holmstrom and Milgrom 1987
have shown in a dynamic principal-agent model that under certain
conditions, the optimal contract will be linear in time aggregate
performance measures. Holmstrom and Milgrom derive for an
intertemporal incentive problem, that at any point in time, the agent should
choose the effort level which affects a drift vector of a Brownian motion
to be constant over time regardless of the output path. In this setting,
compensatory payments will be a linear function of the final outcome
alone. Although intermediate outcomes can be observed, observed
outcomes will be taken into account in the incentive scheme. Thus, in a
stationary environment in which the agent repeatedly chooses levels of
effort and only imperfect signals of efforts can be observed, the optimal
incentive scheme will in the limit have a linear form. In the continuous
version of the model, the agent is assumed to control the instantaneous
drift rate of a multi-dimensional Brownian motion. It is shown that the
optimal incentive scheme for the multi-dimensional Brownian model is a
function of the end-of-period outcome levels of the different dimensions of
the of the process. Even if intermediate outcome were observable, the




8 This result can only be established in general Only for the case where the
agent's action set is one-dimensional for the multi-dimensional case, the
73The intuition of the Holmstrom, Milgrom model can be sketched as
follows: if outcome were a linear function of the effort level and a
normally distributed random variable, and the agent chooses effort over
time and observes intermediate outcomes, the agent is in the position to
condition to effort on this intermediate outcome. For a one-period contract,
Mirrless 1974 has shown that by a stepwise incentive scheme that punishes
the agent severely in the case of very bad outcomes and offers a fixed
payment otherwise, first-best efficiency can be approximated. In a repeated
setting, however, at the end of the time path the agent will only exert some
effort if there is a danger that the final outcome will be sufficiently low to
trigger punishment. If a linear scheme is chosen instead, the agent can be
induced to exert effort steadily over time. Linear incentive schemes have
the property of providing incentives independent of the preceding efforts
of the agent. Thus, the optimality of linear compensation schemes arises
because linear incentive schemes provide incentives regardless of the
timing of outcome realisations. Such an intertemporal incentive problem
can for instance be due to accumulation of pollutants over time.
The results derived by Holmstrom, Milgrom 1987, imply that the optimal
liability rule should computed as "if the agent were choosing the mean of
a normal distribution ... and the principal were restricted a priori to using a
linear rule" (cf. Holmstrom, Milgrom 1987, p. 305). Therefore, let feasible
liability rules be restricted to linear functions of observed damages,
(30) l(q,k) = k + aq ,
optimal scheme will also be linear in aggregate outcome, but will also
require more information.
74where the parameters of liability rule are denoted by a and k. The
parameters will be discussed in more detail in section 4.1.
Environmental damages are preceived to be a linear function of
precautionary efforts by the potential polluter, e, and a normally
distributed random variable, 0, representing the stochastic factors
influencing the degree of environmental degradation
(31) q(e, 6) = -e + e.
Thus, environmental risk is modelled at being normally distributed
69. The
results derived by Holmstrom, Milgrom 1987, though, imply that the
underlying view of the stochastic process generating environmental
damages, has not to be as simple. Nor has the representation of the
stochastic components of the diffusion process in fact to be normally
distributed.
The cost to the polluting firm for a given state of the world, 9, is denoted
by
6
9 Some authors have claimed that it is reasonable to suppose that in the
case of environmental risks the conditions of the central limit theorem are
given (see for instance Holzheu 1994). Moreover, for simplicity, it will be
assumed that the random diffusion process 0 has a zero mean. Allowing a
strictly positive, exogenous background level of environmental pollution
will not change the result that will be derived below substantially. A fixed
background pollution will not alter the incentive compatibility condition
which describes the cost-minimising behaviour of the polluter under the
liability rule (see equation (IQ). A constant background level of pollution
will only enter the participation constraint and might affect the location
decision by the polluter.
75(32) c
1 = l[q(.)] + f(e)
Again, total costs depend on uncertain liability payments, 1(.), and the cost
of pollution control effort, f(e) with increasing marginal costs of
preventive measures
70. Let the precautionary activities of the polluting firm
be described by a one-dimensional variable
71. As an illustration, the costs
of prevention will be chosen to have a simple quadratic form.
(33) f(e) = e
2
Hence, the total costs to the polluter for a given realisation of the random
variable 9 are
(32') c'(e,k,a,9) = k + (-e + 9)a + f(e).
The expected "disutility" of the polluter associated with these costs is
assumed to have the following exponential form
(34) U = E u(q,e) = E[exp (re
1)] = E {exp [r(l(k,e, a,9) + f(e)]}
Hence, the disutility function of the polluter exhibits constant absolute risk
aversion that is indicated by parameter r = u"/u' > 0 . This parameter
indicates the curvature of the disutility function and is an analogue to the
Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion. Notice, that the familar
expontential utility function, u = - exp (-rw), where w is the wage income
7
0 While more general results can be obtained by considering general forms
of the cost of precaution function, a specific functional form is chosen to
simplify the analyis without loss of insight.
7
1 Alternatively, it can be assumed that different activities are always
combined in an efficient manner. A model of multi-dimensional efforts in
pollution control is outlined in Appendix Al.
76of the agent, corresponds to a disutility function where both minus signs
disappear and the function is convex in the cost level.
The expected net welfare loss is again given by
(35) V(q,l) =E [q(e,0) - l(k, q)]
where E q(.) = -e indicates the expected damage and 1(.) are the liability
payments. Note, that one could distinguish between ambient level of
pollution or the physical environmental damage, which is a linear function
of pollution control effort and hence, is also a normally distributed random
variable, and the environmental damage in terms of disutility. For
simplicity, it is assumed that v(q) = q. The benefits of reduced pollution
taking into account preferences of injured party may equally be a concave
function of efforts v(q(.) - 1(.)) or v(q(.)) - 1(.) (cf. Holmstrom, Milgrom
1991).
A. Parameters of the Optimal Strict Liability Rule
Given the framework presented in the previous section, the parameters of
the optimal linear liability rule, k and a, and the level of pollution
prevention induced, e, depend on three exogenous parameters: the
polluter's risk aversion indicated by parameter r, the reservation cost level
of the firm, and the variance of stochastic influence a
2. Any linear liability
rule, 1(.) = k + aq, consists of a fixed payment, k, and the liability share, a,
of the polluting firm in environmental degradation. Under German
legislation damage dependent liability payments that exceed the harm
incurred, i.e. punitive damages, are excluded. Therefore, the variable part
of liability payments may be regarded to be constraint as follows: 0 < a <
771. It should be clear that this, although, it might be sensible given the
objectives of civil law, it is not necessarily optimal in terms of incentives.
Therefore, in the following we will carefully have to scrutinise under
which conditions (i.e. parameter values), limiting liability payments to the
actual harm incurred is also optimal.
In the benchmark case of a = 0, the polluter has not to cover any
environmental damage that is caused (at least partly) by his emissions. This
corresponds to the case of no ex post liability where injured party bears
the risk of a stochastic deterioration of environmental quality. Whether the
injured party will also have to bear some of the costs of environmental
degradation will depend on the size of the fixed ex ante payment k. In the
second boundary case, a = 1, the polluter has to cover all damages
irrespective of the level of care taken. This is the case of a strict liability
rule with complete coverage of all damages (full strict liability). The
polluting firm bears all the risk of a random deterioration of environmental
quality, and pollutees do not bear any risk in this respect. For values of a <
1, damages are compensated only incompletely. Here the polluter will only
be liable for some portion of realised damages (modified strict liability).
Neither the polluting firm nor the injured party will bear the full risk of a
random deterioration of environmental quality.
The fixed amount, k, which is independent of the actual damage deserves
some more detailed explanation. It will beshown that this fixed amount has
no allocative implications with respect to precaution. The fixed payment
can be interpreted as a distribution parameter, which serves to divide the
efficiency gain obtained by the internalisation of the uncertain external
effects between the polluter and the injured party being represented in this
78model by the environmental policy maker. It constitutes an ex ante
compensation for imposing environmental risks on society. These
payments could be used to finance an collective compensation fund that
can either be used to clean-up existing damages (like the Superfund) or to
compensate victims of pollution which for some reason where no able to
enforce their claim (because e.g. the injurer cannot be identified).
B. Determination of the Optimal Liability Rule
For a liability rule to be efficient, its parameters have to be chosen such
that they minimise net welfare loss among all incentive compatible liability
rules which are also individually rational from the point of view of the
polluting firm
72. Therefore, the optimisation problem of the environmental
policy maker can be stated as follows. The policy maker minimises the
difference of expected environmental damages and expected liability
payments
(36) min V(.) = E[q(e, 0) - l(q(e, 9))] = -e - k + ae
with respect the liability share, a,
the fixed ex ante payment, k,
and the induced precaution level e.
7
2 The somewhat confusing terminology used in principal agent theory,
implies that individual rationality refers to voluntary participation and not
to incentive compatibility as the every day meaning of individual
rationality might suggest.
79subject to the incentive compatibility constraint
(IC) e* e arg min U = E u(c'(l,e)) = exp (re')
and the participation constraint
(PC) U = E u(c'(l,e*)) < m ,
where m denotes the cost level attached to the outside option of the
polluter.
1. Incentive Compatible Liability Rules
The optimisation problem can conveniently solved in two steps. In the first
step the best response of the polluting firm to a linear liability rule with
parameters (k,a) is determined. The polluter will choose the level of
precaution that minimises his expected disutility given the liability rule.
Since risk follows a normal distribution and equally environmental quality
and liability payments are linear functions of this risk, expected disutility
to the polluter and the expected net welfare loss are also distributed
normally. Accordingly, expected disutility depends on the summary
statistics of the distribution, i.e. variance and mean. Together with the
specific form of the expected disutility function, the naormality of the
distribution implies that the certainty equivalent cost of the polluting firm
can be computed as the expected costs plus a risk premium. The risk
premium equals half the variance times the risk aversion parameter. The
expected disutility of the polluter for a given linear liability rule
corresponds to a certainty equivalent cost CEC of
80(37) CEC = E u(c') = k - ae + f(e) + Yi ra
2a
2
The costs to the polluter consist of expected liability payments, k - ae, and
the cost of precautionary measures, f(e)= e
2. The certainty equivalent costs
are greater than expected costs by an amount Vi ra
2a
2 related to the degree
of risk aversion and the variance of uncertain liability payments, i.e. the
costs of risk bearing. Risk arises from the fact that environmental damages
and thereby liability payments is only imperfectly correLated with
precautionary efforts
73. The imperfect correlation gives rise to the
possibility that the polluter is held liable although the damage was at least
partly caused by a stochastic event. Although under a zero mean normal
distribution on average the probability of being held liable for higher
damages due to adverse stochastic effects and the probability of lower
damages due to favorable stochastic effects on the assimilation capacity
just offset each other, the possibility of being held liable excessively is
valued more by the polluter than is the possibility of escaping part of the
external cost.
Minimising the certainty equivalent, CEC, with respect to the effort level e
yields the polluter's best response, described by the first-order condition
(FC) a = fe = 2e.
7
3 Although being stated in term of costs, the certainty equivalent
resembles the so-called [i-c approach in decision making under uncertainty
(see Holzheu 1994 for an application to environmental liability).
81Hence, the individually optimal pollution control effort, e*, depends only
on the liability share a and is given by
(38) e*(a) = a/2
This implies that neither the fixed amount, k, nor the reservation utility
level, m, nor any fixed background level of pollution have any impact on
the polluter's effort in preventing environmental accidents. The reaction of
the polluter to a change in the liability rule can also be derived by
differentiating the first-order condition totally
(39) de/da = l/fee=
 lA.
Thus, the change in precautionary effort induced by a rise in the ex post
liability share of the polluter is inversely related to the increase in marginal
cost of pollution control measures. The faster the rate at which marginal
cost rises, the less the reaction of the polluter in terms of carrying out
additional precaution to a sharpening in incentives.
2. Individually Rational Environmental Policy
Substituting the first-order condition of the polluting firm (FC) into the
certainty equivalent CEC yields the certainty equivalent cost at the optimal
level of precaution given the liability rule l(k,a)
(PC) CEC(e') = k - a [e*(a)] + f(e*) + Vi r a
2 a
2
= k - a
2/4 +
 xh r a
2 a
2 < m
82Taking into consideration that the polluter might relocate in response to a
tightening of environmental liability, the certainty equivalent costs exceed
the costs attached to the outside option of the polluter. Moreover it had
been argued previuously that under the optimal liability rule, the
participation constraint has to bind. The equality of condition (PC) is
ensured by parameter k. As k does not affect the level of precaution the
policy maker wants the polluting firm to take, this reflects the idea that in
tort law compensatory payments serve to redistribute damages
74. Hence,
the efficiency of the liability rule does not depend on k. The participation
constraint only limits possible values of k to
(40) k = m + a
2/4 - Vi r a
2 a
2.
The intercept term, k , can be raised if the cost level attached to the
outside option of the firm, m, rises due to a stricter environmental policy
abroad. The fixed amount will also be higher for lower degrees of risk
aversion and lower degrees of uncertainty
75.
7
4 Note that k appears two times, each time with a different sign. This
implies that money can be transferred from one party to the other one-by-
one in utility terms. This is due to the fact that the payment k is certain.
7
5 It can be shown by using the quadratic cost funtion that the relationship
between the parameters of the incentive scheme, a and k, though, is
ambiguous dk/da = 2a/4 - Vz 2 a r a
2 = Vz a - a r o
2 = a (-ra
2 + Vt), dk/da >
0 (<0) if ra
2 < Vi (ra
2 > V^Hence, the more risk averse the polluter or the
higher the variability of the random shock, the less likely it is, that k rises
with a.
83This allows to simplify the incentive problem by disregarding for the
moment the requirement that both parties are willing to participate in the
mechanism by assuming that the polluter does not relocate as a
consequence of the the liability rule. This means that the analysis focuses
on the short run with a given location of economic activities. Whereas a
long run analysis has to take into account that plants can relocate. Now
any linear incentive scheme that minimises the net welfare loss subject to
the incentive compatibility constraint is efficient.
3. Derivation of the Optimal Linear Liability Rule
Having characterised all incentive compatible (and individual rational)
liability rules, in the second step the environmental policy maker chooses
the optimal liability rule. The net welfare loss is given by the
environmental damage minus the liability payments received from the
polluter, for a given state of the world 9
7
6
(42) V (.)= Ev (.) = q (e,9) - l(q(.)) = q(e) - (k + aq) =(1 - a) (-e + 0) - k
which due to risk neutrality is equal to a certainty equivalent loss of
7
6 It can also be shown, that minimising the objective function of the
environmental policy maker is equivalent to minimising total
environmental cost. If the participation constraint of the polluting firm is
disregarded and for convenience set equal to zero, CEC* = 0, this implies,
that L (.) = e
2 + Vi r a
2 a
2. This can then be substituted into the objective
function of the environmental policy maker yielding total expected
environmental costs TCE = -e + e
2 + Vi r a
2 a
2. Total costs are then
minimised with respect to a subject ot the incentive compatibility
constraint.
84(43) CEP = (1-a) (-e) - k
The environmental policy maker minimises this certainty equivalent with
respect to the liability share of the agent, a, subject to the incentive
compatibility constraint (FC). The share in environmental damage that




For Eq = -e and f(e) = e
2, the optimal liability share becomes
1
(44') a =
1 + 2 r O
2
It can be seen that typically the marginal liability payments a will be
deviate from marginal expected environmental damages. The optimal
liability share of the polluter will decline as either risk aversion or the
variance of exogenous stochastic variables increase. In this case the
polluter faces higher costs of risk bearing (inducing him to take excessive
precaution). On the other hand, it can never be optimal to free the agent
from all liability, as in this case he would not exert any pollution control
efforts at all. Equally, in the presence of risk aversion of the polluter it is
never optimal to hold him liable for all damages. Holding the polluter
liable for all occurring damages can only be optimal if the agent is risk
7
7 As TCE" > 0, the first-order condition is sufficient for a cost minimum.
85neutral (r=0). If a
2 is greater than zero, i.e if there is uncertainty involved,
the liability share of the polluter, a, will become smaller. The risk of a
random deterioration of environmental quality is shared between the
polluter and the victims.
7
8
Substituting the optimal share, a, for the case of a quadrartic cost function
into the first-order condition of the polluter yields
2 2+4rcr 2
It can also be seen from the above equation that first-best effort in
prevention of environmental pollution, which is V2, only can be
implemented if the agent is risk neutral (r=0) or if there is no uncertainty
(a
2). In general, however, the effort of the polluting firm to reduce
stochastic negative side effects of production will be lower that the first-
best effort level.
Under certain conditions an (informationally) unconstrained Pareto-
optimal allocation is obtained. The first-best optimum is characterised by
marginal compensatory payments that are equal to the marginal damage
prevented, a = -Qe = 1. Special cases where the first-best solution can be
attained include the case of risk neutrality of the polluter (r = 0) and
complete certainty in respect to causes of environmental degradation (a
2 =
An upper limit of the liability share of one will only be optimal if
marginal environmental damage prevented by an extra unit of precaution
equals one.
860)
79. In both cases, no allocative inefficiency arises. One way of
interpreting this result is that, under these specific assumptions, a liability
rule can be designed to internalise the stochastic externality perfectly and
share environmental risk optimally between parties. This is ensured by a
strict liability rule with complete compensation of all occurring
environmental damages (full strict liability).
Apart from the special cases discussed above, first-best efficiency cannot
be achieved because of imperfect information and risk aversion of polluter.
In the general case where the liability share, a, lies strictly between zero
and one, marginal liability payments are proportional to marginal damage
prevented
80. But expected liability payments are smaller than marginal
damage. Thus, incomplete compensation of damages is second-best Pareto
optimal. By setting liability payments equal to the share in observed
damages as defined in equation (44), the environmental policy maker can
achieve an optimal second-best outcome, i.e. the efficient use of the
environment subject to the informational constraints. It is the absence of
perfect information, that causes a deviation from first-best efficiency.
7
9 From discussion in section III.D it is known that with complete certainty,
the full information solution would enable the environmental policy maker
to link the liability payments directly to the pollution control efforts. The
external effect is internalized completely and the risk averse polluter does
not bear any risk in respect to the stochastic influence factors.
8
0 This share is necessarily smaller than one, as -Q'(e) = 1. The liability
share is greater than zero if, 0< l+2ra
2 < 1. 1+ 2ra
2 = 0 iff a
2 > - Vi r.
874. Conclusions From the Linear Model
The previous analysis has shown that the optimal value of liability
parameter, a, depends on the precision of measuring precautionary efforts
by observed damages. When precaution is observed more exactly, i.e. a
2
converges to 0, the liability share, a, converges to the marginal benefit of
additional precaution Qe . Furthermore, the optimal value of the liability
share is influenced by the polluter's risk tolerance. The higher the absolute
risk aversion of the polluting firm denoted by parameter r, the more the
share of liability payments in actual damages deviates from marginal
damage prevented. Finally, the optimal liability rule depends also on the
reaction of the polluting firm to a change in incentives (de/da = l/fee = Vi).
The more responsive the agent is to sharpened incentives, i.e. the lower fee,
the closer the cost share is to marginal damages.
The results obtained for the optimal liability share in environmental
damages of the polluter under a non-fault liability rule, indicate that the
extent to which the allocation will deviate from first-best efficiency
depends on the following factors: First, the information quality, i.e. the
ability to infer insufficient precaution from the observed environmental
degradation. Secondly, the welfare loss increases with the degree of risk
aversion of the polluting firm. Thirdly, the response of the polluting firm to
a sharpening of incentives is an important determinant of the welfare loss.
The more costly it is for the polluter to react to changes in incentives, the
smaller is the effect of a rise in the liability share on the precaution
undertaken by the polluter. Fourthly, the benefit of precautionary
measures, i.e. the size of the expected environmental damage prevented,
will determine the willingness of the environmental policy maker toprovide incentives. If the marginal benefit of providing incentives
increases, while the cost of risk bearing remain unchanged, the
environmental policy maker optimally will increase damage related
liability payment.
The environmental allocation under the modified strict liability rule will
deviate from full information allocation because of the difference between
marginal damages and marginal liability payments. This difference will
raise total environmental costs. It has been shown that the size of this
welfare loss depends on a number of factors, some of them outside the
control of the environmental policy maker. In an principal-agent setting, it
is the principal who suffers the welfare loss due to asymmetric information
and uncertainty, which prevents a first-best solution to the externality
problem. The agent's welfare level equals always his reservation utility
under the optimal environmental policy. The additional costs will cause the
optimal precautionary effort the environmental policy maker wants to
implement to be lower than the first-best effort level. The difference
between the total environmental costs in the first-best scenario, and the
costs that arise in second-best setting is given by the costs of risk bearing.
The costs of risk bearing indicate the cost of providing incentives
81. The
welfare loss increases with a deterioration of the possibilities to diversify
risk (captured by increased risk aversion parameter r), with increasing
variance of stochastic factors influencing environmental damages, and
8
1 In the context of the theory of the firm it has been called agency costs
(cf. Jensen, Meckling 1976). Agency costs are the difference between the
first-best welfare level and the one that can be attained under the optimal
second-best liability rule.
89with decreasing costs attached to the outside option (i.e. with relaxing
environmental liability laws abroad). If the costs of providing incentives,
and therefore agency costs, become very high, the net welfare loss of the
policy maker (the injured party) due to pollution may outweigh the net
benefits derived from the economic activity generating the emissions. This
global optimality requirement is captured by the participation constraint of
the environmental policy maker.
Assuming that the reservation cost level of the polluting firm and the costs
of precaution are exogenously given, the environmental policy maker has
the following policy options to improve the efficiency of environmental
liability. First, as the agency costs vary inversely with the degree of risk
aversion of the polluter, any policy strategy that opens up to the polluter
better opportunities to diversify the risk of uncertain liability payments will
entail a more efficient use of the environment. Apparently, if there were a
perfectly functioning market for liability insurance, a risk averse polluter
would act as being risk neutral
82. The insurability of environmental
damage are, however, subject of a substantial debate (see e.g. the volume
edited by Kleindorfer, Kunreuther 1987, or the discussion in Eisen 1992,
and Wolters 1995). Apart, from technical problems involved in many
details of such an insurance (such as insuring creeping damages,
"Allmahlichkeitsschaden", or damages arising from regular operation), the
fundamental problem of unobservable precaution remains. The insurance
company will face the same information asymmetry as the one discussed
8
2 The German Environmental Liability Law provides for a compulsory
coverage, with liability insurance as one possible option, in sections 19 and
20oftheUmweltHG.
90here (cf. Shavell 1982 Stiglitz 1983)
83. Due to the moral hazard
phenomenon the precautionary effort will decline if the polluter is fully
insured against liability for environmental damages (cf. Pauly 1974). Thus,
it will be optimal for any insurance company to offer less than full
insurance (cf. Shavell 1979a, 555). Although, one might expect a
competitive insurance market to generate more imaginative solutions to the
moral hazard problem than government authorities (cf. Siebert 1991). But
not only the efficiency but also the existence of a market equilibrium
8
4 may
be substantially endangered, if polluters possess private information
regarding some characteristics of their risk potential (cf. the seminal paper
by Akerlof 1970, more recently Hellwig 1987). Then the insurance
companies will face the additional problem of adverse selection (see
Rothschild, Stiglitz 1976, Wilson 1977). Furthermore, if the objectives of
the insurance company and the environmental policy maker do not
8
3 The analytical framework of principal agent theory can also be applied
to the optimisation problem of an insurance company facing moral hazard.
In a competitive insurance market, the participation constraint has to be
replaced by a non-profit condition which ensures that premiums are
actuarial fair. The insurance company will then maximise profit subject to
an incentive compatibility constraint and the non-profit condition.
Apparently, full insurance cannot be optimal when precautionary actions
by the polluter cannot be observed. The polluter will have to face part of
the liability. This result corresponds to the analysis presented in this paper.
8
4 Whereas a so-called (seperating) Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium (cf.
Rothschild-Stiglitz 1976), based on a Coumot-Nash-conjecture regarding
the contracts offered by competitors, might not exist at all, if insurance
companies anticipate the reaction of their competitors regarding the
contracts offered, there will alsways exist a stable pooling equilibrium (so-
called Wilson Equilibrium, cf. Wilson 1977). The Wilson equilibrium
result, however, does not hold for a continuum of different risk types (cf.
91coincide and, hence, more than one principal aims at influencing the
decisions taken by a common agent, a so-called common agency problem
will arise (cf. Bernheim Whinston 1986, Stole 1991). A second strategy to
improve efficiency of the optimal modified strict liability rule, is to
increase to precision of observing precautionary effort (i.e. to reduce a
2).
So far, the analysis ignored the fact that the efficiency of the liability rule
can be improved the incorporating additional information on the behaviour
of the polluting firm
85.
V. Policy Implications
The previous discussion of the linear model has shown, that only under
certain conditions, a full strict liability rule under which the compensation
equals on the level of environmental damages incurred, can achieve first-
best efficiency. A modified strict liability might, however, achieve a
second-best efficient outcome by forcing the polluter to compensate
victims for part of the occurring damages. This result is in sharp contrast to
traditional models of environmental liability. There any deviation of
liability payments from damage incurred will lead to sub-optimal results
(see Schwarz 1993, Endres 1991989, Heyn 1993). Once information
asymmetries are taken into account, however, the optimal liability rule will
Riley 1979). If markets are imperfectly transparent, Zink 1989 shows that a
Cournot-Nash market equilibrium will exist.
8
5 It has been shown that an incentive mechanism as function solely of
outcome is able to achieve a first-best solution if the agent is risk neutral.
In this case a full strict liability rule will be Pareto-optimal in this case. If
the polluter is risk avers induing an additional variable might imporve
efficiency.
92involve liability payments that are lower than damages. The reason for this
is that a modified strict liability insures the polluter partially against the
risk of a random deterioration of environmental quality. The principal
agent models presented here implies a modified strict liability rule that
does not hold the polluter liable for the full environmental damage. This
modified strict liability rule can be regarded as an optimal institutional
mechanism for sharing environmental damages between the polluter and
the environmental policy maker respectively.
Given the variability of the liability payments, the expected total costs
imposed on the polluter must be strictly lower than the fixed ex ante
payment in the case where the precautionary choice can be observed. Since
the polluter cannot be assigned expected costs that exceed his reservation
cost level m, he has to be compensated for the environmental risk he has to
bear by means of lower liability payments. Therefore, as a result
nonobservability of the precautionary choice leads to a higher welfare loss
of the environmental policy maker when implementing a certain precaution
level. Note, however, that although non-observability leads to a welfare
loss, the liability rule derived here is a constrained (or second-best)
Pareto-optimum. This can easily be seen, because the environmental policy
maker minimises the uncompensated environmental damage to be borne by
the injured party subject to not burdening the polluter with higher
environmental costs than he would have to face in the absence of
environmental liability and subject to an incentive compatibility constraint.
The discussion has already pointed to potential efficiency gains that could
be realised if the precaution taken by the polluter were observable.
93Therefore, by improving the precision of the measurement of pollution
control efforts including additional information may increase the allocative
efficiency. The policy maker's optimisation problem with monitoring is
very similar to the one presented earlier, with the only difference that now
expectations are taken with respect to the joint distribution of outcome
and the additional signal (for an exposition see Appendix). Although a
general principal-agent model does not allow to derive specific regularities
regarding the incentive scheme, it allows quiet strong propositions as to
the variables on which the incentive mechanism should be based
86. The
monitoring literature has shown that, if the agent is risk averse, it is
optimal to incorporate additional information in the incentive scheme (cf.
Holmstrom 1979, 1982) provided that the outcome is not a sufficient
statistic for the effort. The basic idea of incorporating an additional signal
in the incentive scheme is, that it is less likely that consideration of the
signal, s, in the liability rule reduces the chance that when high level of
damages is observed it is incorrectly inferred that low precaution was
taken. It is less likely that both variables observed, q and s, indicate at the
same time a low effort was taken although the polluter has taken a high
level of preventive pollution control. Essentially, the reason for
incorporating signal in the liability rule, is not that it provides additional
information on effort. After all, the effort taken by the polluting firm can
8
6 There is a large literature on the optimal use of additional information.
Besides the seminal paper of Holmstrom 1979, lateron extended in
Holmstrom 1982, Harris, Raviv 1979, Shavell 1979, Gjesdal 1982 and
Singh 1985 have discussed the value of additional signals for the case of
costless monitoring. Other papers which look at the similar questions are
Lazear, Rosen 1981 and Nalebuff, Stiglitz 1983.
94be computed given the liability rule. Consideration of the signal allows to
discriminate the liability payments more according to the observations, as
the chance of a misassessment is reduced (see Rees, 1987, pp. 65ff)
thereby providing more pronounced incentive effects.
In terms of environmental liability, this implies that a liability rule that
includes additional information on effort would induce potential Pareto-
improvements as long as the polluter is risk averse (cf. Shavell 1979). The
fundamental decision between non-fault liability and an effort-based
liability however has to based on a comparison of the informativeness of
the respective signals. Here the issue is not to incorporate additional
information. From principal-agent theory, it is known that the incentive
scheme should be based on the variable which is a more precise signal of
the precautionary effort taken (see Grossman, Hart 1983). The main
problem would be to establish which of the two types of liability rules is
based on the more precise monitor of pollution control efforts. But a
negligence rule constitutes a institutional mechanism that tries to take into
account information on actions taken by the agent in a very specific way. A
negligence rule focuses on the information on the effort in a dichotomous
way. If it turns out that the standard of due care has not been taken, the
polluter will have to cover all environmental damages incurred. Otherwise,
the polluter will only have bear the costs of precaution and some fixed ex
ante fee. Defining a standard of due care can only induce the optimal level
of precaution if actions can be observed perfectly by the environmental
authority. If precautionary effort, however, is not perfectly observable,
similar problems as those discussed in the context of the conditional
reversal of the burden of proof arise. The effects of a conditional reversal
of the burden of proof have shown that, when only an imperfect signal of
95the true effort is observed, depending on the precise parameters of the
model the polluter will either overcomply or undercomply with the
standard of due care. A dichotomous incentive scheme is not necessarily
the optimal way to incorporate additional information
87.
878
8 Usually in worker-compensation problems, it is required that the
distribution function is convex in effort in order to ensure the overall
concavity of the agents utility maximising problem (cf. Rogerson 1985).
96VI. References
Acton J.P., 1989, Understanding Superfund - A Progress Report, Rand
Institute for Civil Jusitice, Santa Monica CA.
Adams, M., 1985, Okonomische Analyse der Gefahrdungs- und
Verschuldenshaftung, Heidelberg.
Akerlof, G., 1970, The Markets for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, 488-500.
Arrow, K.J.and R. C. Lind 1970, Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public
Investment Decisions, American Economic Review 60, 364-378.
Arrow, Kenneth J., 1971, Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing, Chicago:
Markham.
Arrow, K.J. 1986, Agency and the Market, in: Handbook of Mathematical
Economics, Vol.3, Amsterdam, 1183-1195.
Assmann, Heinz-Dieter, 1988, Rechtsfragen des Kausalitatnachweises bei
Umweltschaden, in: Fritz Nicklisch (ed.), Prevention im
Umweltrecht, Risikovorsorge, Grenzwerte, Haftung, Schriftenreihe
Technologie und Recht, Band 10, Heidelberg, 155-177.
Bamberg, G.and K. Spremann, 1981, Implications of Constant Risk-
Aversion, Zeitschrift fiir Operations Research 25,205-224.
Barrett, S., 1994, Strategic Environmental Policy and International Trade,
Journal of Public Economics 54, 325-338.
Bartsch, E., 1995, Environmental Liability, Imperfect Information and
Multidimensional Pollution Control, Kiel Working Papers No. 690,
Kiel Institute of World Economics.
Baumol.W.J.and W.E.Oates,1988, The Theory of Environmental Policy,
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Bebschuk, Lucian A., 1984, Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect
Information, Rand Journal of Economics 15, 404-415.
97Ben-Shahar, Omri and Philipp von Randow, 1993, Strict Liability Versus
Negligence under Incomplete Information, Discussion Paper No.
127 4/93, Harvard Law School, Cambridge MA.
Bernheim, B.D. and M.D. Whinston, 1986, Menu Auctions, Resource
Allocation, and Economic Influence, Quarterly Journal of
Economics 101, S. 1-31.
Bernoulli, D. 1738, Specimen Theoriae Novae de Mensura Sortis, engl.
Translation: Exposition of a New Theory of the Measurement of
Risk, Econometrica 1954, 22, 23-36.
Bohm, P. and C. Russell, 1985, Comparative Analysis of Alternative
Policy Instruments, in: Allen V. Kneese and James L. Sweeney,
(eds.), Handbook of Natural Resource and Energy Economics,
Amsterdam: North-Holland, 395-460.
Borch, K. 1962, Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Market, Econometrica 30,
424-444.
Braden, J. B.and K. Segerson, 1993, Information Problems in the Design
of Nonpoint-Source Pollution Policy, in: C. S. Russell and J. F.
Shogren (eds.), Theory, Modelling and Experience in the
Management of Nonpoint-Source Pollution, Boston, 1-36.
Breining, W., 1990, Umwelthaftung und Umwelthaftpflichtversicherung,
Zeitschrift fur das gesamte Versicherungswesen, 79, 193-203.
Bromley, Daniel W.and Kathleen Segerson (eds.), 1992, The Social
Response to Environmental Risk. Policy Formulation in an Age of
Uncertainty, Boston: Kluwer.
Brown, J.P., 1973, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, Journal of
Legal Studies 2, 323-350.
Calfee, J.E. and Craswell, R. 1984, Some Effects of Uncertainty on
Compliance with Legal Standards, Virginia Law Review 70, 985-
1003.
Coase, R.H., 1960, The Problem of Social Cost, Journal of Law and
Economics 3, 1-44.
98Cohen, M.A., 1987, Optimal Enforcement Strategy to Prevent Oilspills: An
Application of a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard, Journal
of Law and Economics 30, 23-51.
Conrad, K. 1987, An Incentive Scheme for Optimal Pricing and
Environmental Protection, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical
Economics 143,402-421.
Conrad, Klaus, 1990, Taxes on Emissions, Conjectural Variations and
Overinvestment in Abatement Capital, Journal of Theoretical and
Institutional Economics 146, 281-297.
Conrad, Klaus, 1993, Taxes and Subsidies for Pollution-Intensive
Industries as Trade Polcy, Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 25, 121-135.
Cooter, R. and T.S. Ulen, 1988, Law and Economics, Glenview, 111.: Scott,
Foresman.
Cooter, R. and T.S. Ulen, 1986, An Economic Case for Comparative
Negligence, New York University Law Review, December 1986.
Craswell, Richard and John E. Calfee, 1986, Deterrence and Uncertain
Legal Standards, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 2,
279-303.
Cropper, M.L. and W.E. Oates, 1992, Environmental Economics: A
Survey, Journal of Economic Literature 30, 675-740.
Dasgupta, P.S., P. Hammond, and E. Maskin, 1980, On Imperfect
Information and Optimal Pollution Control, Review of Economic
Studies 47, 857-860.
Dewees, Donald N., 1992, The Role of Tort Law in Controlling
Environmental Pollution, Canadian Public Policy 18, 425-442.
Diamond, P. 1974, Single Acitivity Accidents, Journal of Legal Studies 3,
107-164.
Dosi, C. and T. Tomasi (eds.), 1994, Nonpoint Source Pollution
Regulation: Issues and Analysis, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publisher.
99Eisen, Roland, 1992, VersicherungsmaBige Losungsmodelle fur
Umweltprobleme in okonomischer Analyse, in: G.R. Wagner,
Okonomische Risiken und Umweltschutz, Miinchen, 67-83.
Ellis, Gregory M., 1992, Incentive Compatible Environmental Regulations,
Natural Resource Modeling, 6, 225-256.
Emons, Winand, 1990, Some Recent Developments in the Economic
Analysis of Liability Law: An Introduction, Journal of Institutional
and Theoretical Economics 146, 237-248.
Emons, Winand, 1994, The Provision of Environmental Protection
Measures under Incomplete Information: An Introduction to the
Theory of Mechanism Design, International Review of Law and
Economics 14,479-491.
Emons, W. and J. Sobel, 1991, On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules
when Agents are not Identical, Review of Economic Studies 58,
375-390.
Endres, A., 1989, Liability and Information, Journal of Institutional and
Theoretical Economics 145, 249-274.
Endres, A., 1991, Okonomische Grundlagen .des Haftungsrechts,
Heidelberg: Physica.
EU Commission 1993, Commission of the European Community, Green
paper on the Clean-up of Environmental Damages.
Fama, E.F., 1980, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, Journal of
Political Economy 88,288-307.
Feess, E., 1994, Gefahrdungshaftung bei mulikausalen (Umwelt-)schaden-
Eine 5konomische Analyse des Innenregresses, in: Ministerium fiir
Umwelt, Raumordnung und Landwirtschft des Landes Nordrhein-
Westfalen (ed.), Umwelthaftung aus okonomischer und juristischer
Sicht, Eschborn, 227-250.
Feess, E. and U. Hege, 1993, Efficient Liability Rules and Multicausal
Environmental Damage: The Moral Hazard Problem, mimeo.
Feess, Eberhard and Ulrich Hege, 1994, Decentralization versus Efficiency
of Liability Rules with Multiple Defendants, mimeo.
100Fisher, A.C., 1973, Environmental Externalities and the Arrow-Lind Public
Investment Theorem, American Economic Review 63,722-725.
Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole 1992, Game Theory, Cambridge Mass:
MIT-Press.
Gabel, H. Landis and Bernhard Sinclair-Desgagne, 1993, Managerial
Incentives and Environmental Compliance, Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 24, 229-240.
Gjesdal, F. , 1982, Information and Incentives: The Agency Information
Problem, Review of Economic Studies 49, 373-390.
Grigalunas, T. A. and J. Opaluch 1988, Assessing Liability for Damages
under CERCLA: A new Approach for Providing Incentives for
Pollution Avoidance, Natural Resource Journal 28, 509-533.
Grossman, S.J, and O. Hart, 1983, An Analysis of the Principal-Agent-
Problem, Econometrica 51, 7-45.
Harris, M. and A. Raviv, 1979, Optimal Incentive Contracts with Imperfect
Information, Journal of Economic Theory 20, 231-259.
Hell wig, M., 1987, Some Recent Developments in the Theory of
Competition in Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection, European
Economic Review 31, 319-325.
Hermalin, B., 1993, Notes on Principal Agent Theory, mimeo.
Hettige, H., R.E.B. Lucas, and D. Wheeler, 1992, The Toxic Waste
Intensity of Industrial Production: Global Patterns, Trends, and
Trade Policy, American Economic Review 82, 478-481.
Heyn, Wolfgang, 1993, Chancen und Risiken alternativer Haftungsansatze
zur Alloaktion von Umweltgiitern, Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang.
Holmstrom, B., 1979, Moral Hazard and Observability, Bell Journal of
Economics 10, 74-91.
Holmstrom, B., 1982, Moral Hazard in Teams, Bell Journal of Economics
13, 324-340.
Holmstrom, B. and P. Milgrom, 1987, Aggregation and Linearity in the
Provision of Intertemporal Incentives, Econometrica 55, 303-328.
101Holmstrom, Bengt and Paul Milgrom, 1991, Multi-Task Principal Agent
Analysis: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design,
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 7, 24-52.
Holzheu, Thomas, 1994, Umweltpolitik durch Haftungsregeln -
Schadensverhiitung und Risikoallokation, Miinchen.
Jensen, M.C. and W.H. Meckling, 1976, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of
Financial Economics 3, 305-360.
Jewitt, I., 1988, Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent
Problems, Econometrica 56" 1177-1190.
Jost, Peter, 1993, Economic Analysis of Procedural Aspects in the German
Environmental Liability Law, Journal of Institutional and
Theoretical Economics 149, 609-633.
Jost, Peter, 1995, Disclosure of Information and Incentives for Care,
International Review of Law and Economics 15, 65-85.
Kaplow L. and S., Shavell 1992a, Accuracy in the Assessment of
Damages, mimeo.
Kaplow L. and S., Shavell 1992b, Accuracy in the Determination of
Liability, mimeo.
Kirchgassner, G. 1992, Haftungsrecht und Schadensersatzanspriiche als
umweltpolitische Instrumente, Zeitschrift fur Umweltpolitik und
Umweltrecht,15, 15-44.
Kirsch, Guy, 1988, Preventive Umweltpolitik - Chance Oder Illusion,
Zeitschrift fur Umweltpolitik und Umweltrecht 11, 269-285.
Kleindorfer, P.R., 1987, Die Umweltschaden-Haftpflichtversicherung: Ein
Ausblick auf die Krise der US-Versicherungswirtschaft, Zeitschrift
fur das gesamte Versicherungswesen 76, 1-23.
Kleindorfer, Paul R. and Howard C. Kunreuther (eds.) 1987, Insuring and
Managing Hazardous Risks: From Seveso to Bhopal and Beyond,
Berlin.
Klepper, G., 1994, Trade Implications of Environmental Taxes, Kiel
Working Paper No. 628, Kiel Institute of World Economics.
102Kolstad, CD., T.S. Ulen, and G.V. Johnson, 1990, Ex Post Liability for
Harm vs. Ex Ante Saftety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements,
American Economic Review 80,888-901.
Kreps, David M., 1990, A Course in Microeconomics, Hemel Hempstead.
Kunreuther, H., 1987, Problems and Issues of Environmental Liability
Insurance, The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 12, 180-197.
Kwerel, E., 1977, To Tell the Truth: Imperfect Information and Optimal
Pollution Control, Review of Economic Studies 44, 595-601.
Laffont, Jean-Jaques, 1994a, Regulation of Pollution with Asymmetric
Information, in Cesare Dosi and Theodore Tomasi, (ed.), Nonpoint-
Source Pollution Regulation: Issues and Analysis, Dordrecht:
Kluwer, 39-66
Laffont, Jean-Jaques, 1994b, Regulation, Moral Hazard and Insurance of
Environmental Risks, Nota di Lavoro 24.94, Fondazione Eni Enrico
Mattei.
Landes William M, 1971, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, Journal of
Law and Economics 14, 61-107.
Landes, W.M. and R..A. Posner, 1987, The Economic Structure of Tort
Law, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press.
Landsberg, G. and W. Lulling, 1991, Umwelthaftungsrecht, Koln.
Mas-Colell, Andreu, M. Whinston, and Jerry Green, 1995, Microeconomic
Theory, New York: Oxford University Press.
Machina, M.J. 1987, Choice Under Uncertainty: Problems Solved and
Unsolved, Journal of Economic Perspectives 1, 121-154.
Miceli, Thomas J. and K. Segerson, 1991, Joint Liability in Torts:
Marginal and Infra-Marginal Efficiency, International Review of
Law and Economics 11, 235-249.
Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts, 1992, Economics, Organisation and
Management, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.
103Mirrless, J., 1974, Notes on Welfare Economics, Information and
Uncertainty, in: M: Balch, D. McFadden and S. Wu (eds.), Essays in
Economics Behaviour under Uncertainty, 243-58.
Newman, H.A. and David. W. Wright, 1990, Strict Liability in a Principal-
Agent Model, International Review of Law and Economics 10, 219-
231.
Newman, Harry A. and David W. Wright, 1992, Negligence versus Strict
Liability in a Principal-Agent Model, Journal of Economics and
Business 44, 265-281.
O'Riordan.T., 1985, Anticipatory Environmental Policy. Impediments and
Opportunities, Internationales Institut fur Umwelt und Gesellschaft,
Berlin, Discussion Paper 85-1.
P'ng, Ivan P.L., 1983, Strategic Behaviour in Suit, Settlement and Trial,
Bell Journal of Economics 14, 539-550.
P'ng, Ivan P.L. , 1986, Optimal Subsidies and Damages in the presence of
Judicial Error, International Review of Law and Economics 6, 101-
105.
P'ng, Ivan P.L., 1987, Litigation, Liability and Incentives for Care, Journal
of Public Economics 34, 61-85.
Panther, S., 1992, Haftung als Instrument einer Praventiven Umweltpolitik,
Frankfurt: Campus.
Pappel, Roland, 1995, Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste,
Schriften zum Umweltrecht, Band 49, Berlin: Duncker und
Humblot.
Pauly, M.V., 1974, Overinsurance and the Provision of Insurance: The
Role of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selcetion, Quarterly Journal of
Economics 88,44-54.
Polinsky, A.M., 1979, Controlling Externalities and Protecting
Entitlements: Property Rights, Liability Rule, and Tax-Subsidy
Approaches, Journal of Legal Studies, 8, 1-48.
Polinsky, A.M., 1980, Strict Liability vs. Negligence in a Market Setting,
American Economic Revue 70, 363-367.
104Polinsky, A.M., 1989, Introduction to Law and Economics, 2nd Edition,
Boston, MA: Little Brown.
Polinsky, A.M. and D.L. Rubinfeld, 1988, The Deterrent Effects of
Settlements and Trials, International Review of Law and Economics
8,109-116.
Polinsky, A.M. and S. Shavell, 1979, Optimal Tradeoff between the
Probability and the Magnitude of Fines, American Economic
Review 69, 880-891.
Posner, R.A., 1986, Economic Analysis of Law, 3rd edition, Boston.
Pratt, J, 1964, Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large, Econometrica
32, 122-36.
Priest, George L., 1991, The Modern Expansion of Tort Liability: Its
Sources, Its Effects, and Its Reform, Journal of Economic
Perspectives 5, 31-50.
Raiffa, H. 1968, Decision Analysis: Introductory Lectures on Choice under
Uncertainty, Reading Mass.
Rauscher, M., 1991, Foreign Trade and the Environment, in: H. Siebert
(ed.), Environmental Scarcity - The International Dimension,
Tubingen, 17-31.
Rauscher, M., 1992, Economic Integration and the Environment: The Case
of Europe, in. K. Anderson and R.Blackhurst (eds.) The Greening of
World Trade Issues, New York, 173-194.
Rauscher, M., 1995, International Trade, Factor Movements and the
Environment, forthcoming Oxford University Press.
Rees, R. 1985, The Theory of Principal and Agent, Bulletin of Economic
Research 37, 3-26, 75-95.
Roberts, M.J. and M. Spence 1976, Effluent Charges and Licences Under
Uncertainty, Journal of Public Economics 5, 193-208.
Rogerson, W.R., 1985, The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agents
Problems, Econometrica 53, 1357-1367.
105Rothschild, M. and J. Stiglitz 1976, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance
Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 90, 629-649.
Rothschild, M.and Stiglitz, J., 1970, Increasing Risk I: A Definition,
Journal of Economic Theory 2, 225-243.
Rubinfeld, Daniel L, D. Sappington, 1987, Efficient Awards and Standards
of Proof in Judicial Proceedings, Rand Journal of Economics 18,
308-315.
Russell, Clifford S., Jason, and F. Shogren, 1993, Theory, Modeling, and
Experience in the Management of Nonpoint-Source Pollution,
Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Sappington, D., 1991, Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships, Journal
of Economic Perspectives 5, 45-66.
Schwarze, R., 1994, Kausalitatsregeln bei Wahrscheinlichkeitsschaden-
Eine okonomische Analyse, Diskussionsbeitrag 11.1994, TU Berlin.
FB Wirtschaftswissenschaften.
Segerson, K., 1987, Risk-Sharing and Liability in the Control of Stochastic
Externalities, Marine Resource Economics 4, 175-192.
Segerson, K., 1988, Uncertainty and Incentives for Nonpoint Pollution
Control, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 15,
87-98.
Segerson, K., 1994, Property Transfers and Environmental Pollution:
Incentive Effects of Alternative Policies, Land Economics 17, 261-
272.
Shavell, S., 1979, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal Agent
Relationship, Bell Journal of Economics 10, 55-73.
Shavell, S., 1980, Strict Liability versus Negligence, Journal of Legal
Studies, 13,1-25.
Shavell, S. ,1982, On Liability and Insurance, Bell Journal of Economics
13, 120-132.
Shavell, S., 1984, A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety
Regulation, Rand Journal of Economics 15, 271-280.
106Shavell, S., 1985, Uncertainty Over Causation and the Determination of
Civil Liability, Journal of Law and Economics 28, 587-609.
Shavell, S., 1987, Economic Analysis of Accident Law, Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press.
Siebert, Horst, 1987, Environmental Pollution and Uncertainty: Prevention
and Risk Allocation, in: Holzheu, F., (ed.); Society and Uncertainty,
Karlsruhe, 167-179.
Siebert, H., 1991, Liability Issues in Pollution Control, in: J.S. Opschoor,
D.W. Pearce (eds.), -Persistent Pollutants: Economic Policy,
Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Press.
Siebert, H., 1995, Economics of the Environment: Theory and Policy,
Fourth, Revised and Enlarged Edition, Berlin: Springer.
Siebert, H., J. Eichberger, R. Grnoych, R. Pethig, 1980, Trade and
Environment: A Theoretical Enquiry, Amsterdam.
Simonis, U. , 1984, Preventive Environmental Policy, Concept and Data
Requirements, Internationales Institut fur Umwelt und Gesellschaft,
Berlin, Discussion Paper 84-12.
Singh.N., 1985, Monitoring and Hierarchies: The Marginal Value of
Information in a Principal-Agent Model, Journal of Political
Economy 93, 599-609.
Spremann, K., 1987, Agent and Principal, in: G, Bamberg, K. Spremann
(eds.) Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives, Berlin: Springer,
3-37.
Spulber, D.F., 1988, Optimal Environmental Regulation and Asymmetric
Information, Journal of Public Economics 35, 163-181.
Stiglitz, J.E., 1975, Incentives, Risk, and Information: Notes toward a
Theory, Bell Journal of Economics 6, 552-576.
Stiglitz, J.E., 1983, Risk, Incentives and Insurance: The Pure Theory of
Moral Hazard, Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 8, 4-33.
Stole, L., 1991, Mechanism Design und Common Agency, mimeo,
Department of Economics, MIT.
107Streissler, Erich, 1994, The Problem of Internalization of and Liability for
Environmental Damages, in: Klaus Mackscheidt, Dieter
Ewringmann, and Erik Gawel (eds.) Umweltpolitik mit hoheitlichen
Zwangsabgaben, Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 245-260.
Strobele, W. J., 1992, The Economics of Negotiations on Water Quality -
An Application of Prinicipal-Agent-Theory, in: R. Pethig (ed.),
Conflicts and Cooperation in Managing Environmental Resources,
Berlin: Springer, S. 221-239.
Taupitz, Jochen, 1993, The German Environmental Liability Law of 1990:
Continuing Problems and the Impact of European Regulation,
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, 19, 13-37.
Tobey, J.A., 1990, The Effects of Domestic Environmental Protection on
the Patterns of World Trade: An Empirical Test, Kyklos 43, 191-
209.
Ulph, A, 1992, The Choice of Environmental Policy Instruments and
Strategic International Trade, in: R. Pethig, (ed..), Conflicts and
Cooperation in Managing Environmental Resources, Berlin:
Springer, 111-129.
Ulph, Alistair, D. Ulph, 1994, Trade, Strategic Innovation and Strategic
Environmental Policy- A General Analysis, Working Paper No.
1063, Center for Economic Policy Research.
Varian, Hal, 1992, Microeconomic Analysis,Third Edtition, New York.
Weitzman, M.L. 1974, Prices versus Quantities, Review of Economic
Studies 41, 477-491.
Wilson, C, 1977, A Model of Insurance Markets with Incomplete
Information, Journal of Economic Theory 16, 167-207.
Wolters, Georg 1995, Wettbewerb auf dem Versicherungsmarkt,
Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang.
Xepapadeas, A.P., 1991, Environmental Policy under Imperfect
Information: Incentives and Moral Hazard, Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 20, 113-126.
108Zink, H., 1989, Zur Rolle der Markttransparenz in
Versicherungsmarktmodellen. Auswirkungen asymmetrisch
verteilter unvollstandiger Informationen auf Marktlosungen,
Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.
Zweifel, Peter and Jean-Robert Tyran, 1994, Environmental Impairment
Liability as an Instrument of Environmental Policy, Ecological
Economics 11,43-56.
109Appendix
VII. Appendix A1:The Multidimensional Pollution Control
Model
Two types of precautionary pollution control
observable precaution et
unobservable precaution e2
Expected environmental damage Q(e,,e2 )= Eq(elle2;6)
0 ~ N(0, a
2e) stochastic diffusion process
marginal expected environmental damage Q1; Q2 < 0






Cost of precaution £{et,e2)
marginal costs of precaution fu f2 > 0
strictly convex d
2 f > 0:
fii>0, f22 >0 f 12 = f2i fi i f22 -fi2
2>0, fi2<or > 0;
110A. Socially Optimal Precaution
Min SC (eb e2) = Q(e,, e2) + f(eh e2)
First-order conditions are given by
Qi +/; = 0
(22 +/2 = 0
B. Conditional Reversal of the Burden of Proof
The polluting firm will be presumed to have caused the damage incurred if
and only if Sj < n with Si being an imperfect signal of the actual effort eh,
Si = e, + £y with £/ ~N(0, G
2£) denoting observation error, described by a
density function g(£i) = gCsi-e,).
Causality will be presumed for a given standard of regular operation
1 if Si(ej) < n
0 otherwise
The probability that the polluter will be subject to the causality
presumption
p(sl <n)=p(ei+el<n) = J #(£,>*£, = G(n-ex)
where G(.) denotes the cumulative probability distribution.
Total expected cost of the polluting firm
111TC=f(e,,e2) + Q(e1,e2)G(n-e1)
Assuming strict convexity of TC, the following first-order condition
guarantee a minimum of total costs under a conditional causality
presumption for the polluting firm
f,(e,,e2) + Q,G(n-e,) - Q(.)g(.) =0
fi{ehe2) + Q2 G(n-g;) = 0
provided that ehe2 > 0 at the optimum.
Under the conditional presumption of causality a change in precaution
entails two effects on marginal expected liability payments
(1) damage effect QiG(.), G(.)<1,
lowers c.p. the level of both precaution types
(2) liability effect -QC)g(-),
increases c.p. the level of (observable) precaution
Evaluating the first order conditions at the social optimum (i.e. - Qj = fj)
shows that D2 (G-l) > 0, i.e. that e2 unambiguously declines, whereas Q\
(G-l) - Q(.)g < or > 0 implying that the net effect on e! is ambigous.
However, as both first-order conditions have to be satisfied
simultaneously, changes in the optimal level of one effort type will lead to
a change in the optimal level of the other effort type. Depending in
whether different pollution control strategies are substitutes or
112fur W&itwirtsdiaft Kiel
complements, the effects derived above may be reinforced or partly offset
by the interdependences among optimal precaution levels.
1. Optimal Interdependent Choice of Pollution Control Measures
The total precautionary impact of a conditional causality presumption
depends on both the direct impact and the indirect impact caused by the
interdependencies of different pollution control strategies. Neither the
direct impact nor the indirect impact is clear cut. Two cases have to be
distinguished
SUBSTITUTES fI2 >0 Ql2> 0
COMPLEMENTS fl2 <0 Ql2 < 0
If efforts are substitutes, the marginal cost of (marginal damage prevented
by) carrying out one type of precuation rises (decreases in absolute terms)
with an increasing level of the other effort type. If, on the other hand,
efforts are complements, marginal cost (marginal effectiveness) of one
effort type declines (rises) as the level of other type increases. Therefore
one would expect, the optimal choice function describing the
cost.minimising level of one effort type for alternative levels of the other
effort type, to be positively sloped in case of complements and to be
negatively sloped in the case of substitutes.
Differentiating the first-order condition under a conditional reversal of the





de, Q22(G(.)) + f22
SUBSTITUTES
dei/de2 < 0 ; de2/dei < 0 unambiguously
COMPLEMENTS
de/de2 < or > 0 ; de2/dei < or > 0 ambiguous
\Q2g(.)\<\fi2\ \Q2g(.)\<\G(.)Ql2\
= > de!/de2>0
otherwise => de|/de2 <0 counter-intuitive !
Hence, for the case of substitutes the interdependence is unambigous. For
complements, however, the counter-intuitive case might arise that the
observable (unobservable) effort decreases when the unobservable
(observable) effort is raised, although efforts are complements. The
following table summarises the different inbdirect effects one can observe
depending on whether efforts are substitutes or complements.


















The total impact of the provisions under UmweltHG on precaution depend
on both, whether or not the liability or the damage effect dominates and on
whether different strategies in pollution control are substitutes or
complements. Assuming for simplicity that optimal choice function can be
represented by straight lines, the different cases are illustrated in Figure
Al.
115FIGURE Al : ILLUSTRATION OF THE OVERALL IMPACTS OF CONDITIONAL CAUSALITY
PRESUMPTION
As it has been derived above, in the case of substitutes, the optimal choice
functions will be negatively sloped, whereas in the case of complements,
they will have a positive slope. Superscript S denotes the first-order
condition for a social optimum. The optimality condition under the
conditional causality presumption are indicated by superscript N. The
damage effect will c.p. lead to an inward shift of the optimal choice
function. By contrast, the liability effect will c.p. lead to an outward shif of
the optimal choice function for the obeservable effort type. Therefore, in
the case of a dominant damage (liability) effect, this curve will shift to the
left (right).
116Thus, a dominant damage effect will in the case of substitutes lead to
moderate reductions of both effort types. In the case of complements, by
contrast, the cost-minimising levels of both effort types will decrease more
for a given shift of the optimal choice functions. In this case, the damage
effect will be reinforced by the interdependence between different
pollution control strategies. By the same reasoning, a dominant liability
effect, raising ei, will be reinforced when different strategies are
substitutive. Table 2 summarises the different precuation levels that will be
induced.
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117Note that in the case of perfect observability of ei the polluter will exert no
unobservable effort in pollution control at all when effort are substitutes.
VIII. Appendix A2: Limitations of the First-Order Approach
There are some technical problems involved in using the first-order
approach (cf. Grossman, Hart 1983). The objections raised by Grossman,
Hart 1983 have lead to the by now standard procedure of stating the
principal agent model with hidden action with a finite number of possible
actions and a finite number of possible outcomes (cf. e.g Kreps 1990, pp.
529ff). The results derived for the optimal incentive scheme are, however,
very similar. As the focus of this paper is not on the technical details of
solving principal-agent models, it will be assumed that the conditions hold
under which the first-order approach being more convenient in applied
work is valid. Moreover, the Grossman, Hart approach only produces
interpretable results under fairly strong conditions (which in turn are
sufficient for the first-order approach to be valid in the first place, cf.
Jewitt 1988).
The crucial point is that it not generally legitimate to substitute the
incentive constraint (IC)
(IC) eeargmin \u(l{q))h(q\e)dq f(e)
Q
by the first-order condition (FC)
(FC) ju(l(q))he(q\e)dq + fe=O.
Q
118The first-order condition is only sufficient for a global cost minimum for
the polluting firm, if the total cost function of the polluting firm is convex
in precautionary effort e. The total costs will be convex, if its components
are convex functions of precautionary effort. As the costs of precaution,
f(e), are convex by assumption, the crucial part of the total costs function
to look at is the disutility attached to uncertain liability payments. Whether
the disutility attached to liability payments is convex will in turn depend
on the liability rule itself. And the liability rule itself is endogenously
determined. For the case of sharing output between the manager and the
owner of a firm, conditions have been derived under which the first-order
approach is valid (cf. Mirrlees 1975, Rogerson 1985). Applying those
conditions to the internalisation of uncertain environmental damages
discussed here, the conditions whcih ensure convexity are the Concavity of
the Distribution Function Condition (CDFC) and the Monotone Likelihood
Ratio Property (MLRP)
88.
The CDFC simply states that the distribution of damages H(d,e) is concave
in precaution at all levels of damage, i.e. He > 0, Hee < 0. Intuitively, this
means that an increase in precautionary effort has a decreasing marginal
impact on the probability of an improvement in environmental quality. In
addition, the density function of damages h(qle) being parametrised by the
precaution taken has to have a monotone likelihood ratio. More precisely,
the MLRP in the internalisation problem presented here requires that
d q h(q\e)
119The MLRP states that the observation of a higher level of damage is more
relatively likely, if a lower level of precaution has been taken, i.e. the
likelihood ratio is monotone decreasing in q. Thus, if a higher damage is
observed, one can infer statistically that the polluter has taken lower
precaution. The MLRP also implies that (if the first-order approach is
valid) that liability payments increase with observed damage q, i.e. l'(q) >
0. Many distributions, as for example the normal distribution, satisfy the
MLRP.
To prove formally that the total cost function of the polluter will be convex
for every optimal incentive scheme integrate the overall cost
CO) = J u(l(q))h(q\e)dq + f{e) .
Q
by parts, which gives
C(e) = [u(l(q))H{q\e)]\ - ]u'(l(q))l' (q) H(q\e)dq +f(e)
C(e) = u(l(q)) -]u' (l(q))V (q) H(q\e) dq + f(e)
q
The first term is constant, and the integral will be a convex function if the
distribution function H(qle) is concave in e. Since all weights are positive
(u
1 > 0 and l'(q) > 0), the weighted sum of H(.) will as well be convex.
Thus, C(e) is a convex function of e. Q.e.d
120IX. Appendix A3: The Role of Risk-Aversion on the Part of the
Policy Maker
Throughout most of the analysis the environmental policy maker has been
assumed to be risk neutral. This section addresses the question of the
implications of risk aversion on the part of the environmental policy maker
in the linear framework presented in section 4. Due to potential
irreversibilities of a certain use of the environment or unknown threshold
levels in the assimilative capacity of ecosystems, the environmental policy
maker might very well be risk averse (cf. Siebert 1995, 265ff). Moreover,
for public good dimensions of the environment, risk pooling is not
possible. A risk averse policy maker will implement a tighter
environmental policy than a risk neutral decision maker. This is the well
known principle of preventive environmental policy (cf. Simonis 1984).
Let the environmental policy maker have same type of exponential net
welfare loss function, as the polluting firm, i.e.
V = E{exp[rp(q(e,e)-l(q(.))]}
where rp is the degree of risk aversion of the policy maker. Accordingly,
the certainty equivalent of the net welfare loss of the policy maker will be
CEP = q(e, 6) - l(q(.)) + Vi rp a
2 a
2
= -e - (- ae + k) + Vi rp a
2 o
2.
Minimising this certainty equivalent with respect to the liability share, a,




The parameter ra denotes the risk-attitude of the polluter. If the
environmental policy maker is assumed to be risk averse, the liability share
will be the higher (the lower), the higher the degree of risk aversion of the
policy maker (the polluter). For very high levels of risk aversion of the
polluter, the liability share converges to the marginal environmental
damage prevented and the induced precautionary effort towards Vi (cf.
Strobele 1992 for a similar discussion).
X. Appendix A4: Efficiency Gains from Monitoring Pollution
Control Activities
The model is now extended to allow for monitoring of the polluter. It is
assumed that even with monitoring the polluter there remains some
information asymmetry such that courts, when enforcing the optimal
liability rule, cannot observe the level of precaution taken exactly. Instead
they only observe an imperfect signal, s, of the true effort taken.
s = g(e, 6).
To keep the analysis straightforward, it will be assumed that the
observation function g(e) are known beforehand
89. The only decision the
8 In particular, at this stage it is excluded that the principal by devoting
more resources to monitoring can reduce the variance of the error term's
distribution. In this case, there is no marginal calculus as to whether more
monitoring should be carried out. Therefore, monitoring costs are
neglected alltogether. Obviously, monitoring that they can not exceed the
122environmental policy maker has to take then is as to whether this
additional information should be included in the liability rule. And if so in
which way should the observation enter the optimal liability rule.
Monitoring may reduce the information asymmetry but including an
additional uncertain variable in the incentive scheme will give rise to
additional costs because the polluter is assumed to be risk averse.
Therefore, even if the signal could be observed costlessly, there will in
general be a trade-off. The environmental policy maker may, however, still
find it advantageous to base liability not only on the damage observed but
also on the additional signal of the level of precaution taken. So now, when
designing a liability rule, the policy maker will choose a rule l(q,s) that
depends on both the damage q(e,0) and the signal s(e;G).
Let the joint density distribution function of the signal, seSc^K, and the
environmental damage q be h(q,sle). The joint distribution function is
understood as being parametrised by the precaution effort. The
environmental policy maker faces the following minimisation problem
min v = \ j q(e,9) - l(q,s)h{q,s\e)dq ds
s
subject to
welfare gain achieved by improvements in the incentive mechanism caused
by including additional information. It should also be noted, that even, if
monitoring would be costless, it is not necessarily improving the situation
if the signal is included, since due to imperfect observability, there also
risk involved.
123(PC) I ju(l(q(e,d)) h(q,s\e)dq ds + f(e)< m
S Q
(FC) J ju(l(q(e,9))he(q,s\e)dqds+fe =0 .
S Q
This problem is identical with the one presented earlier, with the only
difference that now expectations are taken with respect to the joint
distribution h(q,s,e). Accordingly, pointwise minimisation gives the
counterpart to equation (28
1).
ti(Kq)) * h(q,s\e)
Thus, if the likelihood ratio varies with the observed signal s, the liability
rule will be modified according to the signal. If s as thought to represent,
for example, the safeguards installed (he (s) > 0), the liability payments for
a given level of q will be lower when s in incorporated in the liability rule.
Consideration of the signal, s, in the liability rule assigning compensatory
payments reduces the chance that when high level of damages is observed
it is incorrectly inferred that low precaution was taken. It is less likely that
both variables, q and s, indicate at the same time a low effort was taken
although the polluter has taken a high level of preventive pollution
control
90. Obviously, it is only useful to incorporate the signal if liability
9
0 Essentially, the reason for incorporating signal in the liability rule, is not
that it provides additional information on effort. After all, the effort taken
by the polluting firm can be computed given the liability rule.
Consideration of the signal allows to discriminate the liability payments
124varies with the signal. This will be the case if q is not a sufficient statistic
fore.
more according to the observations, as the chance of a misassessment is
reduced (see Rees, 1987, pp.65ff).
125